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Report No. FWIS(Norway)/36

SECRET

REPORT ON INTERROGATION OF Stubaf Karl LEIB
AKERSHUS PRISON, OSLO 7 16 NOV 48ACTIVITIES OF AMTSGRUPPE D (GERMANISCHE LEITSTELLE)
IN SWEDEN

1. Source of information. Information in this report given to Karl LEIB directly from the following sources:
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|-------------|----------------------------------|
| Dr. RIEDWEG | Chief of Einsatzstab in Oslo. |
| v. EDELSTAM | German Ambassador in Stockholm |
| KAYSER | German mil. attache in Stockholm |

2. INTENTIONS AND ATTEMPTS AT POLITICAL ACTIVITIES THROUGH THE AMTSGRUPPE D IN SWEDEN.

Sweden was described by Amtsgroupe D as "The country of unbelievable possibilities".

With this thought in mind it was intended that Sweden should be used to mediate and establish a peace with the western allies. In order to achieve this the following policy was to be adopted as from Dec 43:

- The establishment and upkeep of good connections with leading Swedish personalities in the political and economic world.
- Strict observation of a planned political policy as laid down by the German Foreign Office, which was to leave Sweden in no doubt as to Germany's straightforward and honest disposition towards neutral Sweden.
- Strict observation of Germany's trade agreements.

The establishment and upkeep of good relations with leading Swedish personalities and the canvassing for suitable candidates to promote Dr. Riedweg's policy were entirely dependent on the items mentioned in para b and c above. With the exception of the German Foreign Office the Amtsgroupe D could do little to further this scheme.

RIEDWEG's personal connections were the former Swedish Foreign Minister GUNNAR, Sven Hedin, Lindholm, a Finnish-Swede Oberst ECKSTROEM resident in VASA (Finland), the Swedish author ERIKSEN (notorious through his anti-semitic and anti-freemason literature), the president of the Swedish Chamber of Industry and Commerce in STOCKHOLM and other university professors and economical personalities.

German political and military policy throughout the war was a hindrance to the work of the Leitstelle in Sweden. The leading factors were espionage within Sweden, the Auslands Organisation of the NSDAP and the conduct of TERDOVEN in Norway, who did not think it necessary to establish good relations or even contact with the German Embassy in Stockholm or leading Swedish personalities. RIEDWEG's position was gradually made weaker by the above factors. Not until the 20 Jul 44 did Amtsgroupe D make further attempts to re-establish former connections as planned by RIEDWEG. For this purpose Amtsgroupe D employed a Baronin von MUNCK in STOCKHOLM. LEIB does not know in how far she met with success.

As was the case in nearly all the German Ministries and Head Departments, the foreign office saw an infiltration of personalities who attempted to work actively in Foreign Politics during the last few months of the war. LEIB gives the following examples:

a) Herr SUNDBERG, the representative of the Norwegian Nachrichtenbureau (NTB) in Berlin appeared in Oslo round about Easter 1945 charged by Amtsgroupe D with a special task. He was to approach QUISLING, who with his apparently good connections with Sweden was to arrange certain favourable terms for Germany for an acceptable peace with the Western Allies. QUISLING was to get further instruction from Berlin at a later date. The German Government gave QUISLING the assurance of complete safety and safe conduct. He was to have no fears of his own future. This was discovered and disclosed later by Abteilung III B&S.

b) A certain German personality at the German Embassy in STOCKHOLM

was reported to have gone to great pains in establishing terms and conditions with Russia through Mr. KOLONAI. Russia was reported to have acted on this offer prior to the January Offensive. Russia had apparently guaranteed Germany her Eastern frontier as in 1941, but insisted on complete control over the Balkans. This proposal was however turned down by Ribbentrop. (LEIB received this information from Hr. SUNDBERG).

In Dr. RIEDWEG's opinion there were only two possibilities for political activity in Sweden.

a) Promoting the sympathies of pro-German and anti-bolshevist personalities movements and press.

To establish political activity RIEDWEG needed financial support which Amtsgruppe D was not in a position to give. There were without doubt pro-German and anti-bolshevist elements in Sweden but they were too small and scattered to establish any firm links. Furthermore there were subdivisions both in organisations and policies resulting in disputes over their party programmes. LINDHOLM was regarded by Amtsgruppe D as a man worth backing even though he considered his political activities as a business deal. His correspondence with HITLER in which financial matters were the main theme left no doubt about that. RIEDWEG could have handed his work over to the AO of the NSDAP which was very active in Sweden, in spite of the opposition put up by the German Embassy. RIEDWEG's chief fears was the Swedish police with its excellent Information System. R. gave up all ideas of using Sweden as a possible mediator for an agreement with the Western Allies at the end of 43. At the same time he abandoned political activities within Sweden.

b) The Canvassing of Swedish Volunteers for the Waffen-SS

The long range policy was to obtain these young Swedes for service in the Waffen SS and after their service at the front and their political schooling they would form a nucleus in Sweden which might be compared to an SS-Junker Schule. After their two years service with the Waffen-SS they would return to their country and act as a catalyst within the National Socialist movement in which the Amtsgruppe D put great hope and faith. Positive action on the part of these young SSmen was of no importance during the war time, but their political influence was to have been decisive after hostilities. With this policy in mind, RIEDWEG was most anxious to recruit the maximum number of Swedes. He set himself first the task of solving the problem of exit viass.

ci) Agreement between Germany and Sweden.

The King of Sweden gave his consent for Swedish subjects to serve on the Eastern front with the Waffen SS in late 1941. An agreement to that effect was signed between RIBBENTROP AND GUENTHER.

On the strength of this some 90 Swedes, equipped with passport and visa, came over to Norway and joined the Waffen SS in Germany. They were medically examined and provisionally accepted for the Waffen SS by the Ersatzkommando Norwegen prior to despatch to Germany.

When members of the Ersatzkommando Norwegen realised the possibility of this form of obtaining volunteers they launched a Propaganda campaign and slackened off the call up of routine conscription of Norwegian volunteers who would normally have found service with the Waffen SS in Norway. This caused King Gustav to recall his decision and instead he allowed the Swedish anti Bolshevist elements to serve with the Finnish army against the Russians. By this means Amtsgruppe D had lost the first round and obtained no further volunteers for the Waffen SS.

ii) Unofficial recruiting and frontier crossing to Norway.

Attempts of this kind which were made by RIEDWEG were an utter failure.

During LEIB's service in Norway a maximum of ten Swedes joined the SS by this means. For canvassing within Sweden RIEDWEG employed his old acquaintance the Finnish-Swede Oberst ECKSTROEM. In close cooperation with the LINDHOLM movement (probably more on material grounds) he did his best to please RIEDWEG. When later he realised that RIEDWEG's means were limited, he began to pull out.

In 1943 RIEDWEG employed a German specialist on this matter, Dr. KUEHNE, with the help of Swedish Frontkämpfer of the Waffen SS tried a new angle of recruiting and canvassing. The Swedish police, however, very quickly put an end to this activity. KUEHNE's activities were mentioned in the Swedish press. It was probably the German representative in STOCKHOLM

who persuaded Amtsgruppe D to refrain from any further work after 1943. KUHNE's harvest was very small, but those that did arrive in Norway were equipped with passports and visas.

III) Recruiting Swedes for Finland.

The last remaining possibility left open for Amtsgruppe D was to recruit Swedes and Finnish Swedes from the Finnish army for the Waffen SS. This move was started in 1943, but had no appreciable results. LEIB realized that the presence of Swedish volunteers in the SS was of considerable prestige value to Amtsgruppe D, since he was bitterly reproached from Berlin, when he began to release these men under a private agreement made between LEIB and LILLEHOEG, attache to Swedish consulate, Oslo. As late as the middle of 1943 the Swedes were allowed to have their leave in Sweden. This was quite official and it was not until later that the Swedish police stopped their return over the frontier for further service with the Waffen SS.

3. THE WORK AND ACTIVITIES OF THE AO OF THE NSDAP IN GENERAL AND IN SWEDEN.

During LEIB's first few weeks in Holland in 1942 he realized when talking with members of the MUSSELT party what the work of the Auslandsorganisation of the NSDAP had been in the years before the war. LEIB gained the impression in conversations with Rost von TONNINGEN, SPREY and others, that they formed the nucleus of a fifth column and traitors. After the occupation of the country concerned these men formed the main spring of DORMANN's Einsatzstab.

In LEIB's opinion the AO carried out the cultivation of their kind in Sweden right to the very end of the war. According to Swedish press reports, the espionage activities were nearly always carried out by German citizens. LEIB suspects that the AO was not only used by the Wehrmacht but also by the RSHA for information purposes. In as far as the Amtsgruppe D was concerned, the AO was merely the recruiting centre for Swedish volunteers. They approached the AO and asked for their help and advice as to how they could obtain passports, visas etc. In the actual recruiting campaign they were inactive, probably on account of the advice given by the German embassy to the AO in 1942 to refrain from their part in the campaign.

4. THE ATTITUDE OF THE GERMAN EMBASSY TOWARDS THE ACTIVITIES OF AMTSGRUPPE D IN SWEDEN.

In information summaries and reports of the Amtsgruppe D constant references were made about the negative conduct of the German embassy in STOCKHOLM during the years 1942-43. They were negative in as far as they, the German consul and the Military Attache did not cooperate with and even impeded the recruiting of Swedish volunteers.

LEIB spent one day in Stockholm in Oct 1943 and visited the German consul DANKWORTH and the military Attache. Their first request to him was to ask BERLIN to refrain from further attempts of recruiting volunteers. In a very clear and emphatic manner they pointed out their views on RIEDWEG's campaign. (They had probably found out his name through the German Foreign Office.) They were both very annoyed at the incidents which had taken place which were caused by the unpardonably stupid German "experts" of whom Sweden was blessed with a great number. They argued that they did irreparable damage to the good relationship between Germany and Sweden, and that the negligible number of volunteers they manage to scrape together could not be of any decisive nature in winning the war.

LEIB reported the matter to BERLIN as it was reported to him by DANKWORTH and the Military Attache. The result was that Amtsgruppe D removed their agents and work to Finland at the end of 1943. The German Military Attache brought the notice of the Aussenstelle of the RSHA in Sweden. The Leiter (Chief) of this organisation was named by the name of FINKE (?) who was employed as a clerk in the office of the German Commercial Attache in the German Embassy. He was very annoyed at this but in a way relieved to be rid of NEUMANN who was also active in the interest of HIMMLER and HEYDRICH in the years 1941/42. Both DANKWORTH and the Military Attache remained in their disposition towards Amtsgruppe D to the end.

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5. NEUMANN'S ACTIVITIES IN SWEDEN.

NEUMANN was according to the conversation REDIES ~~LEIB a protégé of HEYDRICH~~ and a favourite of HIMMLER. His career in the SS was said to have been quite brilliant. He passed all courses with great success and was regarded as outstandingly successful in all his duties. He was HEYDRICH's Adjutant and commanded a unit at the front during the war. In REDIES' opinion this man was suitable for any sort of employment or position. LEIB states that in a conversation with NEUMANN it came out that NEUMANN had been charged with some special task in SWEDEN by HIMMLER and HEYDRICH in 1941/42. He claims as his "own work" the existence of a Swedish National-Socialist press the name of which was either "Dagsposten" or "Folksbladet". By means of this paper he claims to have raised funds. It came out that NEUMANN must have worked very closely with a certain THURNER who worked in the German Embassy in the capacity of a Propaganda man.

NEUMANN was the predecessor of FINKE but had the additional characteristic of being political.

He was very well acquainted with GUENTHER. During his stays in STOCKHOLM he was always a guest in the house of the GUENTHERS. His last visit was at the end of 1944. LEIB suspects that the agreement between Germany and Sweden for Swedish volunteers to serve in the Waffen SS (which was sanctioned by the King) must have been very largely if not entirely due to NEUMANN.

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