

SECRET.

BRITISH MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES.

FUTURE GRAND STRATEGY - WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE GERMAN WAITING POLICY.

I think we are all agreed that consideration of what the Allies should do to win the war is becoming a matter of ever increasing urgency. The demise of Finland is clearly already having its effect upon the attitude of neutrals. There are many other indications that there is a growing feeling in the world that Germany may very well win. This only encourages Germany to believe that her present general policy is the correct one. Should that be the case it is of the greatest importance that we should be sure that our policy is also correct

... I understand that Admiral Chalmers sent the attached Paper, or a very similar document, to General Ismay for his reactions to a contemplated submission of such a document to the Chiefs of Staff. General Ismay's first reactions seemed to be that the subject was so complex that its examination would be difficult to implement. If that is so that does not in any way vitiate the contention that the question ought to be resolved. It only means that special steps must somehow be taken to find the answer.

It may be that one or all of the British Representatives have shown this document to their Directors of Plans in an unofficial manner. In any case we have been led to understand that the J.P. organisation has either started, or is about to start, an examination of future grand strategy.

At the same time, this Paper discusses a particular, and evidently very important, aspect of the future, and I suggest it might be worth while putting forward the ideas in the attached in a more formal manner, without actually forwarding them officially to the Chiefs of Staff.

This can be done by authorising me to send copies of the document, by your direction, to each of the Directors of Plans. My covering letter to them would be in the form of saying that the British Representatives on the Allied Military Committee are anxious to represent this contention to the Joint Planning organisation.

This method is, as it were, more formal and official than the individual transmission by each B.M.R. separately of any view to their respective Directors of Plans.

If this idea commends itself to you, you might doubtless wish to effect some redrafting of the attached. With that I would append your signatures to the three copies and forward the Paper in the method proposed above.

You will note that the Paper would not become an M.R. document, and consequently, of course, the Directors of Plans would not be called upon to take any action upon it. They might feel that no action was necessary in view of what the Joint Planning organisation may be doing. On the other hand, it does represent a particular facet, which might not otherwise be treated with the seriousness you consider necessary.

16th March, 1940.

*[Handwritten signature]*