

110027

Assistant Professor Dag Ellingsen

Department of Criminology, University of Oslo

Economic Collaboration Trials

Address given at the Symposium on

The Norwegian Purge Processes in Comparative Perspective

Bergen 25-26 November 1994

Principal aspects of the purge process.

From 1945 onwards, 92,000 Norwegian men and women were investigated regarding their relationships to the German occupying forces during the war. This was a process which lasted longer, concerned more people, and became more complex than one had foreseen immediately after the liberation. People were investigated, charged, prosecuted, and convicted for various types of offences. Economic collaboration with the enemy, however, was not the major reason for people being investigated, brought before the court, and sentenced.

Altogether 46,000, exactly half of a total of 92,000 people investigated, suffered repercussions of some sort for treason. Nearly half of the cases had to do with membership of the Nasjonal Samling (the National Unification Party or the N.S.), supporting the Nazi movement or related organizations; another 10,000 cases concerned people who had been actively involved with the 'Hird' (Quisling's bodyguard) or similar organizations. More than 7,000 of the cases were described as "active engagement in offices and positions of trust within

the Nasjonal Samling, and in the activities of nazified businesses and organizations". What I prefer to call the 'ideological' types of treason dominated the purge trials.

Whereas the question of economic collaboration pertained to somewhat more than 16,000 of those who were investigated, it was not nearly as common among those who were actually sentenced. Profiteers were penalized more rarely than ideological traitors. Approximately 50 per cent of all those investigated had to 'account for' their offences. Among those investigated for economic collaboration, the number convicted was considerably lower: 20 per cent. (For a more detailed perspective of the quantitative picture of the purge process, see "Statistical Report on Treason 1940-45"; "On the Purge Processes" 1962, and Andenæs 1980 pp. 134 and 165-168.)

Selection of Cases.

My study (Ellingsen 1993) is primarily based on a selection of 57 people in a total of 49 firms. I chose to deal with one specific business, namely the construction industry. This was the industry most subjected by German interests to collaboration pressures. From the cases relating to this industry, I have selected two groups: All business people within this sector who operated in the county of Telemark in southern Norway, and who were subjected to investigation; and the majority of the big operators in this field on a country-wide basis.

I have drawn from general descriptions of the purge trials as well as from the large amount of literature on the Second World War in Norway. My work in no way claims to be a standard work on the Norwegian trials of economic collaborators. The whole topic of economic collaboration with the enemy during the war has, in my opinion, been seriously neglected by Norwegian historians. My study is a first attempt at getting closer to the topic. As a criminologist and sociologist I suspect I might tend to emphasize certain approaches and aspects that are different from those usually preferred by

historians.

People sentenced for collaboration could be sentenced according to two acts or ordinances (legal information quoted below is from Andenæs 1980). For more serious offences, people were convicted according to the Penal Code. For the economic collaborators, the Penal Code, section 86, applied, which sanctions a person who "offers the enemy assistance in the form of advice or action". In addition, there was the treachery ordinance of 15 December 1944, which was replaced by an act of 21 February 1947 of similar content. The treachery ordinance was intended to hit minor offenders, such as 'pure' NS members and smaller economic traitors. It allowed to a larger extent the catching of minor traitors by having a lower prescribed penalty scale, which also was the main objective of the treachery ordinance. The treachery ordinance section 2 no.3 came to be significant in the purge trials. It allowed punishment to be given to "the person who, subsequent to 8 April 1940, had committed or taken part in commercial activities for the enemy in such a way or under such circumstances that the relationship must be regarded as improper".

Here we find the most important and problematic concept of 'improper'. Originally, the traitor ordinance contained a listing of improper activities. Following the war, this was deleted, as it was considered awkwardly and inappropriately formulated. After this, the decision as to whether or not a

business activity was improper was to a large extent based upon a complete assessment of each case. The most important considerations were as follows:

If the work was of importance to the war. Construction at airfields and fortification sites was regarded as more serious than, for instance, power plant or road construction.

If the work was initiated on a non-compulsory basis. The person who had taken the initiative himself was judged more severely than one who had acted under pressure.

If the work had been carried out by a reputable firm trying to keep the labour force employed as opposed to a newcomer trying to exploit the possibilities offered by war.

If the work was carried out early or late in the war. The later a job was undertaken the more severely it was usually judged. At the beginning of the war, the fact that confusion was prevalent and that municipal and national administrations did much to accommodate requests by the Germans, were seen as mitigating circumstances. From the middle of the war onwards, people's general resistance level was higher, and fighting at the battle fronts grew more intense against the Germans, which should have caused business people to realize that by

accepting enemy business orders they were engaging in improper business activities.

Economic collaborators were liable to the same penalties as other traitors whom I somewhat imprecisely have generally called 'ideological collaborators'. Punishments consisted of the death penalty, and custodial penalties such as imprisonment, forced labour, or fines. The treachery ordinance also allowed people to be deprived of a wide variety of rights.

When police investigations of people in the category of 'economic collaborators during the war' are examined, we see that the range is wide, stretching from nearly all the well established lumber mill owners and entrepreneurs, through the big local figures in industry, down to workers who had formed companies in order to take part in the dance around the golden calf.

Motives for assisting the occupying forces appear to have been varied. Some people saw the opportunity to strike while the iron was hot, some felt compelled by being repeatedly approached by the Germans, while others took on work for the Germans because there was no other work available. Many had, probably from sheer habit, taken part in the competition for profit making ventures. Some were fortune hunters who, war or no war, were used to taking chances when opportunity for profit knocked. Others again had been members of Nasjonal

Samling since the mid-thirties and considered working for the Germans legitimate, militarily as well as economically and politically.

Variations.

Profit from economic collaboration shows the greatest variation. The smaller businesses had had a few periods of intense activity only to see modest profits soon vanishing as a result of unstructured economic planning. Some of the smaller enterprises, or those established during the war, managed, however, to expand several times. This does not imply that they had a greater turnover or profit than most of the larger enterprises; what is significant is their rate of growth.

Relationships with the Germans who assigned work to these businesses were also varied. Some, primarily the smaller and less well established businesses, practically offered the Wehrmacht or the Luftwaffe their services. On the other hand, the largest contractors and lumber suppliers were approached by German representatives, and asked, threatened, or forced to make staff and materials available. Some who had been given work were fortunate in that their reputations were not ruined by subsequent investigation; others felt the approaches offensive. Among well established businesses, some were not beyond advertizing their services in German magazines or NS

publications, or maintaining a polite and an obliging correspondence with German clients.

From this wide range of actions, motives, and social backgrounds, the police, the prosecuting authority, and the courts had to determine which cases to investigate, whom to prosecute, and the kind of penalties to impose.

The Decisions.

We can detect a pattern in the legal authorities' treatment of this mixed group. The larger, well established lumber dealers and contractors stand out as a class accorded rather mild treatment. Custodial penalties were hardly ever imposed upon this class; the majority of cases were dropped or the people acquitted.

The smaller and not so well established business people were as a rule treated considerably harder. Most severely penalized were those who, in addition to having worked for German interests, had become members of the Nasjonal Samling. However, most of these 'double traitors' were responsible for only minor offences in both areas. The NS membership was for the most part a passive one, subscribed to for opportunistic reasons, namely the securing of orders, or because it was thought that membership was useful for retaining German clients. Economic collaboration might have secured the

individual person a decent income, but compared to the members of the larger contracting firms within the industry, they were of only minor significance.

In summing up the main elements of the entire purge process and the impressions gained from my selection of cases, I would draw attention to the following main trends:

a) On the whole, the trials were mild. Few were penalized, and those who were, often escaped with fines or rather short prison sentences.

b) Bigger companies were generally given fewer and less severe penalties than smaller companies.

c) The most severe penalties were imposed on smaller business people who were also members of the Nasjonal Samling.

d) Nearly all companies within the industry as well as more than 100,000 ordinary workers had assisted the German powers in strengthening "Festung Norwegen" ("Fortress Norway").

How can these findings be explained? I am going to draw attention to some major points:

1. The economic crisis prior to the Second World War.

The years prior to the Second World War had created sociological conditions favourable to an economic collaboration with the occupying force during the war which was to come. Both the population as a whole and businesses had suffered long lasting economic hardships. Unemployment and stagnation had to be fought against. The years prior to the outbreak of war had, however, brought a growth which had given people the taste for a somewhat better lifestyle, something perhaps which made it all the more difficult to become attuned to enemy occupation with its economic chaos and depression.

2. Cooperation by companies and authorities.

Companies were prepared for war but not for occupation. Warehouses were filled and equity generally low. After 9 April 1940, however, one's usual customers were lost and replaced by a German occupying force with an insatiable demand for lumber, contractors, and builders of barracks. At the same time, the message from the Norwegian authorities was to cooperate with the Germans and to 'keep the wheels moving'.

This caused a boom in the building and construction trade for the first two war years. Smaller and larger contractors, lumber merchants, and general workers in tens of thousands, jumped on the merry-go-round of economic collaboration with the occupying forces. Business interests were the principal motives for this cooperation.

3. Differences embedded in the Law.

Less severe treatment of larger businesses was to a great extent a reflection of the way in which the legal authorities perceived the interpretation of the treachery ordinance relating to improper conduct. This does not imply that inequality before the law was intended in the interpretation of the treachery ordinance. But individual sentences or the decisions of the prosecuting authority may be based on proper legal grounds in respect to treason even if the outcome does not seem to indicate equality before the law.

Throughout the war, larger businesses had more opportunities to avoid the construction of sites of military importance, such as airfields and defence sites. They possessed staff and building materials that were equally suitable for the construction of power plants and smelting works, which were not considered of military importance. The construction of sites of military importance by the larger and well established businesses generally took place during the early phase of the war - activities frequently excused when the then existing level of cooperation was taken into account.

Larger businesses did not have to offer their services to the Germans; on the contrary, the Germans approached them because they had what the Germans wanted.

They had staff which they were responsible for keeping employed, and therefore the acceptance of the only available jobs, the German ones, could be justified.

From the middle of the war onwards, the larger businesses possessed, as noted, a better capacity for securing themselves civil Norwegian jobs. They also had the financial security, in the expectation of the end of the war, to allow themselves to reduce production, to let the business run at half speed.

An interesting theory here is that the legal authorities had not foreseen the market forces that were to result in the law favouring the larger businesses. They were more concerned with whether people had acted in accordance with current attitudes. If the contractors or lumber mill owners had acted more or less in line with these throughout the war, this was seen as having more significance than the analyzing of the individual's market power, market position, and scope for activity.

The legal authorities divided the war years roughly into three periods, each with its particular significance in the assessment of sentencing. The early period lasted from the attack on Norway on 9 April 1940 until Terboven's speech on 25 September of the same year, when he declared that cooperation with pre-war Norwegian authorities had ended and that in future one would have to relate to Nasjonal Samling. The confused atmosphere of cooperation during this period favoured

those investigated and accused. It seemed to be of no great significance in criminal decisions that a number of important military deliveries took place while fierce battles were fought during April, May, and early June.

The period from September 1940 until the mid-1942s was generally considered by the larger contractors as an extension of the 'cooperation period'. During this time, old contracts came to an end. Since people's resistance had not yet fully manifested itself, undertaking assignments for the Germans was regarded with less severity.

From 1942 onwards, becoming involved with the Germans was increasingly condemned, resistance attitudes developed in an increasingly positive direction, and people began to realize the implications of collaborating with the Germans and the Nasjonal Samling.

It is only reasonable to regard resistance attitudes among the population to be a key factor when determining the degree of guilt in respect to wartime activities. But is it right to emphasize this aspect to such an extent when business leaders were concerned? Could it be that the legal processes after the war concerned themselves primarily with questions of resistance and collaboration? Did they not see business people as clever market actors? Did it come about that many got milder sentences because they were seen as having acted in an astute manner in relation to the existing market situation?

It appears as if the legal authorities had ignored the possibility that a decreasing interest in German clients towards the end of the war might not necessarily have reflected nationalistic feelings. The move might equally well be regarded as a clever adjustment to the market situation. By interpreting messages from the battle fronts, most people could see that the war might not end to the advantage of the Germans, and that in the long run they might not be such useful trading partners. Or perhaps the relinquishing of German assignments might be seen as a sign of economic strength and an ability to assess market conditions. Briefly stated: Company leaders were judged as good or bad Norwegians rather than as good or bad business people.

4. Working Methods of the Police and the Courts of Justice.

Inequality before the law was also prevalent because of the way the purge processes were carried through. The time aspect seems to be of significance in this respect.

Most of the investigated war profiteers had a long time to wait for the police, the prosecuting authorities, or the courts of law to arrive at a decision regarding their cases. On average, it took three years and seven months before those investigated were presented with final decisions. This average, however, obscures considerable variations: one person's case was completed as early as March 1946, 'only' ten

months after the end of the occupation; another's as late as seven years and two months after the last German had surrendered.

The cases presented in my study took considerably longer than the other purge trials. By the first six months of 1947, approximately three-quarters of the total number of cases had been decided, whereas eight out of ten persons dealt with in my research were still awaiting a decision. Half of those had their cases decided by September 1949, but the remaining half had to wait even longer. Those sentenced during the earlier period received on average more severe punishments.

The later sentences were milder partly because feelings were less strong, partly because the cooperative attitudes prevalent during the early stages of the war were beginning to reassert themselves, and partly because the police, the legal authorities, and the general public wished to leave the war behind them. The post-war period was a time of reconciliation and reconstruction. However, new enemies arose. With the emergence of the Cold War, attention shifted from Nazi Germany to the Soviet Union, and in Norway the communists to a certain extent assumed something of the position of the outsider previously occupied by Nasjonal Samling.

Delays in the economic collaboration trials were also due to the dynamics of the trials. Cases against informers, persons close to Quisling, torturers, and other criminals were given

priority. The trials concerning regular NS members went relatively smoothly because the question of proof was relatively simple. The trials concerning profiteers were seen as rather complicated as well as time consuming, and hence tended to move slowly; they also took longer because those accused were clever at defending themselves, and presented the police and the prosecuting authorities with more than usual opposition. It was hinted that there were deliberate delays in handling certain cases. The nature of the cases seemed to change as time passed because it appeared that much of the collaboration with the Germans was rooted in an extension of the general cooperation that existed during the early stages of the war. The part played by the defendant at the trials was of particular significance because to a certain extent counsel for the defence was not always assigned during the criminal investigation. Unless one was prepared to bear the cost of a defence, such assistance was not usually granted until the time of the main hearing of the case before the court. Actually, a number of cases were settled prior to this stage.

Larger companies and their directors might also have benefited from the rather small numbers within the Norwegian legal profession where lawyers who had worked for businesses before and during the war might, after the war, during the purge processes, have acted as representatives of the prosecuting authority or the Compensation Directorate. In this way business people were judged by those who had first-hand knowledge of, and opportunity to familiarize themselves with,

the difficult decisions contractors and lumber mill owners had to make during the occupation. Basically, it might be an advantage for people to be 'judged by their own kind', but a major concern is whether others sentenced for treason should also have had the advantage of such intimate understanding of their cases.

Obviously the trials of economic collaborators were on average more complex than other trials. However, clarification is necessary here: rarely were there difficulties in tracking down the firm that had delivered specific goods, the owner of the firm, and the size of the delivery. German customers were generally meticulous in their filing systems, and, for the most part, this was the case with Norwegian businesses as well. At times, the allocation of responsibility within individual firms could have created obstacles for the investigators, but these were in no way comparable to some recent criminal cases of an economic nature. As far as the purge trials were concerned, police investigations were more or less completed by 1946, but delays occurred in waiting for the formal decisions of the higher courts of justice. In some instances the processes were delayed because defence counsels and prosecutors were over-burdened.

To put it differently: Trials of economic collaborators were far more complicated than the majority of the trials of ideological collaborators, but then the cases of the profiteers were either deliberately made more complicated, or

the complexities were more clearly comprehended by the investigating and judicial authorities.

Reasons why double traitors came off worst in the purge processes.

Sentences for NS supporters were severe. In my study of 14 people with NS adherence, 11 suffered penalties under criminal law. Of the other three, two had died before they were even summoned, and one managed to flee abroad. Of the 11 sentenced, only one did not have to endure custodial sentence; the other ten for the most part were severely punished. One was sentenced to five years of forced labour; another to four and a half years of the same 'medicine'. From the material available for my study, these were the two most severe sentences given. The average length of a custodial sentence was almost two years - actually, one year and eight months - whereas the average sentence for the remaining people was slightly over one year.

In this respect, time is relevant. NS cases were brought before the court ahead of other cases presumably for two reasons: There was factual evidence to relate to since NS

membership had been meticulously documented in membership files as well as in the lists of names of people who had supported other NS related organizations. A strong additional element was profiteering. Again, sentences had been clearly established, so that police and legal authorities were well aware of the fines and years of imprisonment for such offences as passive NS membership, parading in the uniform of the 'hird', or supporting the German SS. Penalties for these offences were already high, and there is, therefore, little reason to believe that profiteering had any additional significance for the sentencing of smaller contractors.

It was for obvious reasons easier to track down NS members for investigation than to obtain the complete picture of those war profiteers warranting closer investigation. This suggests that some of the economic collaborators were identified because they had unwisely become members of the Nasjonal Samling. If this supposition is correct, we should have to assume that there is an undetermined number of smaller economic collaborators who were never subjected to investigation.

The NS profiteers were generally capitalists in a small way. Only one had a particularly large financial turn-over; during the war he was able to sell goods and services to the Germans alone amounting to 44 million Norwegian kroner. However, four out of the 10 NS profiteers had a recorded war turn-over of well below one million kroner prior to the end of the war, with bankruptcy eventually closing their businesses for good.

My recorded material indicates that these firms on average supplied the Germans with goods and services amounting to approximately 16 million kroner throughout the war years. NS firms supplied German clients with practically all their goods. These figures are, therefore, comparable.

NS profiteers were characterized in another significant way not appreciated by the legal authorities, namely, they rose up in the world by doing business with the Germans. Seven of them had had no experience whatsoever as contractors before the war. By getting work on German sites they soon learnt the how and the why of becoming self-employed.

An additional factor which usually increased the sentence was that nine out of ten had sold their entire stock to Germans who frequently were representatives of the Wehrmacht; the tenth person supplied the Germans with 85 per cent of his turn-over.

NS adherence was, on the whole, not sufficiently serious to result in more severe sentencing. In one case, a person sentenced to five years of forced labour, had been involved in various additional activities with the Hird, including armed activities, with serious consequences. For most others, NS adherence seemed to emerge from general opportunism in the hope that membership might secure them German construction jobs. At least they believed so. It is probably more likely that the Germans would have used their services nonetheless.

More profound ideological commitment rarely emerges from the case files.

Opportunism, however, was severely judged by Norwegian legal authorities after the war. It was accepted as a principle in sentencing that those who prospered by doing business with the Germans during the war should be particularly severely punished. 'The respectful profiteer', on the other hand, had established his business prior to the war; he did not expand it greatly during the war, and produced only his usual quantity of goods and services. The horror portrait was that of the 'nouveau riche' who offered his services for sale to the Germans, and who pandered ideologically to them in order to increase their profits.

Another interesting collaboration phenomenon is the so-called "ettermiddagsjøssingene" or "evening patriots", a not altogether flattering term given those who made substantial profits by serving the Germans while still pretending to be nationalists and patriots at evening social gatherings. The term is decidedly derogatory and indicates that the person concerned was no genuine patriot but rather, to use the jargon of the time, "striped". Their resistance activities became almost an act of conscience salving, something done to retain an outward pretence, primarily to escape unscathed from any post-war charges.

For some, the term "evening patriot" is indeed fitting. Being

sceptical of the enemy was something these 'patriots' did not become alert to until the very end of the war when it became apparent that having German clients was in the long run a poor investment. This scepticism was often seen in the form of favours offered the Resistance group or individuals in difficulty. Quite a number of people who were well off were looked up by families whose main supplier had been imprisoned or had had to flee to Sweden. The typical evening patriot was the lumber mill owner from Telemark who lent out small amounts of his wealth to people in difficult circumstances in return for a receipt bearing a promise to repay. These receipts he stored until after the war, whereas the remainder of his bookkeeping and correspondence was thrown into the fire at the time of the liberation.

However, this image of ambivalence, pretence, and conscience salving was not typical of all those investigated for economic collaboration, who had also served the resistance. Some risked their lives in fighting, and had quite heavy economic losses, at the same time as they were serving the Germans or were profiting financially from war work of value to the occupying forces. Among the 'well established' entrepreneurs listed in my material, several had taken part in underground work. Thanks to this, they were generally considered in a more favourable light during the post-war trials. It is difficult to say whether this was a deliberate strategy or simply a reflection of the fact that most Norwegians did not get actively involved against the Germans until they realized that

the Germans were losing the war.

In his analysis of the investigation of business people from the area of Sunnmøre (on the north west coast of Southern Norway), Steinvåg (1986) has found that resistance activities were important mitigating circumstances in some cases.

Steinvåg's study is restricted and his material was unknown to me when I wrote my book. However, it seems clear that his and my own findings are in many ways similar.

Too mild, or too severe?

Were large scale activities judged too leniently and small ones too severely? It is not possible to pass sound judgement on the purge processes 50 years after the events, neither is it worthwhile nor proper to judge these actions in retrospect. But it seems fair to maintain that those operating on a large scale were charged less severely than those who worked on a small scale - particularly if they were NS members.

Should the bigger operators have been sentenced more severely? From a general deterrent perspective, it is tempting to answer 'yes'. Severe sentencing of a large business carrying a well known name most likely would have set moral standards among businesses, and could have deterred others, if not from committing treason, at least from engaging in various forms of criminal economic activity. Further, large businesses were

judged leniently because they were able to use rights which should have been available to everybody, particularly, for example, the opportunity to conduct an active defence. They were also able to use to their advantage the plea of mitigating circumstances: especially that of cooperating with the enemy in the early period of the war being regarded as not altogether undesirable. Such situations were crucially important mitigating circumstances, though in some instances they were carried too far. There was a tendency to tolerate too much on the grounds that the central authorities had stressed the importance of keeping the wheels moving.

The belief that most people went far in order to satisfy requests by the Germans during the early period of the war, and that businesses for the most part stayed apart from the resistance fighting, has not to any degree been supported by the purge processes. Awareness of this does not seem to have benefited the smaller NS sympathisers. Needless to say, the general economic cooperation during the greater part of the war did not imply any acceptance of Nasjonal Samling actions. However, the increasing awareness of the absence of opposition to the Germans in some areas and at particular times, might have implied a greater tolerance of the actions of NS members. Perhaps, the relationship between cooperation and resistance might not have been seen at the time in such black and white terms.

The economic purge processes had greater educational potential

than the trials against other traitors. April 9 will never again be repeated, and in the event of another occupation or war, entirely different moral dilemmas might emerge. It is undeniably true that people in the business world constantly find themselves in moral dilemmas. A war creates extreme situations, but even day-to-day business activities can put people's lives in danger.

Resistance, market, and moral standards.

To be effective, resistance fighting during wartime requires strong organization. The individual person cannot present much opposition. By refusing to work for the enemy he risks the job being given to somebody who might carry it out far more thoroughly. He also risks becoming the only one, or one of a few, exposed to severe sanctions. However, with the knowledge that others would take the same risks as he would in opposing the existing powers, resistance seems less hazardous.

Organization and solidarity appear to be absolutely essential for being able to oppose requests from the occupying power. Without a well organized resistance, Norwegian teachers' and ministers' fight against the 'new structure' would have been futile. However, in the business world it was, for quite a long period, everybody for himself. If contractor A refused to build a defence site contractor B - and perhaps even C and D - was readily available to take on the job. Further, contractor B

was also quite prepared to take over A's staff and machinery.

When the laws of the jungle get to reign in this way, the entire industry can easily land up in a sort of moral quagmire.

Similar situations are also found in today's business world, where rival industries are, even in a time of peace, in a constant state of war; at least, this is the image frequently presented by the terminology employed. In tough competition one fights for market shares, and the struggle for customers is unrelenting. In this fight, all possible weapons are used. If one desires a competitor's business one swoops on him. If a leader does not succeed he releases his parachute. Industries facing tough competition in almost warlike situations often find that some people will stop virtually at nothing to secure contracts. In order to offer reasonable tenders, businesses may begin avoiding normal taxation regulations in respect to staff wages, they may cut back on some safety margins, or they may work at a health threatening speed. When competition is particularly ruthless, whole industries may fight on the most cynical premisses. The only options available are withdrawing from business altogether or howling along with the other wolves.

To combat abuses of this kind, either strong organization and sound attitudes within the industry, or rigid government regulations, are required. During the war, lawful Norwegian

government control was not exercised in important areas, and industry did not offer noticeable resistance, with the result that a moral quagmire was created.

Literature

- Andenæs, Johs: Det vanskelige oppgjøret. Tanum-Nordli, Oslo 1980.
- Ellingsen, Dag: Krigsprofitørene og rettsoppgjøret. Gyldendal, Oslo 1993.
- Om landssvikoppgjøret (On the Purge Processes). Recommendation by a commission collecting material for a report by the Ministry of Justice presented to the Storting. Royal Ministry of Justice, Oslo 1962.
- Statistikk over landssvik 1940-1945 (Statistical report on treachery 1940-45). Statistics Norway. Oslo 1954. NOS.XL. 179.
- Steinvåg, Odd Arve: "Økonomisk landssvik på Sunnmøre 1940-1945". ("Economic collaboration at Sunnmøre 1940-1945"). Treatise. University of Bergen, 1986.