

From Ralph Hewins, c/o Mr S.D. Carver, Holly Cottage,
Bramshott, Liphook, Hants, UK. (042-872-2040).

Herr Andreas Stangeland,
1360 Nesbru, Landøyveien,
Norway.

*Copy to Bibliothek
Postel Buren, IFS.
R41.*

Dear Herr Stangeland,

I thank you - regrettably late - for your letter of
January 5 in beautiful English.

I am glad and honoured to receive formal confirmation from
the IFS executive committee (5/10-71), authorising and
financing me to research British Government documents (1939-
1945) relating to Norwegian contemporary history and
recently released for study at the Public Record Office,
London.

Before and since the receipt of your letter, I have
investigated the possibilities at the Record Office. They
are enormous. It would take a team a lifetime to examine
the Cabinet and Foreign Office papers exhaustively, let alone
to take or copy all the interesting material.

But happily the documents are well indexed: the staff
are helpful: the facilities are ample: the fees are
very moderate. Xerox copies cost only 6 New Pence (about
1 N. Kr) each.

The main practical drawback is that students may only
use ordinary pencils or typewriters for note-taking - a
time-wasting process.

I have already obtained a reader's card without
difficulty and no sponsorship is required by the IFS or other
institution.

I have begun to list the Norwegian documents in the
index and a random reading already reveals several note-
worthy items:

1. 28/4-40. Lord Halifax (Foreign Secretary), the Admiralty
(Churchill), the War Office and Air Ministry, the Ministry
of Supply and the Norwegian Legation in London approved a
mission by Consul Jonas Lied, vice-chairman of the Aluminium
Union, to obtain a declaration from his old friend, Vidkun
Quisling, stating that he had been "tricked" by the Germans.
Lied was also to rescue aluminium, which was accomplished by
Norwegian fishingboats later.
2. 4/6-40. Laurence Collier (later Knighted and Ambassador to
the Royal Norwegian Government) stated:

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"The Norwegian Communist Party is being tolerated, if not encouraged by the German authorities in ~~XXXXX~~ Oslo. No measures have been taken to dissolve it ... A manifesto to the Norwegian people, published by the NCP, declares that the German occupation of Norway was the result of the 'Anglo-French striving to extend the war and in the British mine-laying' ... and that the Norwegian people were not interested in war between the Great Powers ... They insist that the war must not be transferred to Norwegian territory', etc". A minute by Fitzroy Maclean says: "It would be hard to find a better indication of the extent of Soviet-German co-operation".

3. 15/1-41. The 13th Report by the Chiefs of Staff Committee to the War Cabinet, submitted on the Prime Minister's instructions, says: "On December 18, 1940, the Norwegian Forces came under the operational control of Commander-in-Chief Home Forces". This was signed by the heads of the British Services, Dudley Pound (Navy), J.G. Dill (Army) and C. Portal (RAF).

The strength of these volunteers was stated to be -
Navy: two Town Class destroyers to be manned "shortly" -
Army: 98 officers, 1328 other ranks, 7 nurses - Air: training was being "discussed".

4. 4/2-41. Churchill regretted that "quisling" had become attached to Norway and added "I am afraid the word 'quisling' has come to stay".

5. 25/3-41. J.G. ard of the FO Northern Dept. noted: "We feel that mass arrivals of a 'political' nature, such as those from the Lofoten Islands, would require rather special handling".

Newsam of the FO also noted: "I suggest that the proper course from every point of view is to lay down in advance that such persons should go to the (Royal Victoria Patriotic) School and that we should be quite firm ... In the first place neither the Home Office nor the FO has yet received any official intimation at all on the subject of the arrival of this large number of aliens (300), some of them purporting to be volunteers and some of them alleged "Quislings". There were also German seamen, civilians and officials ... From the security point of view it is important that contact with outside people should not be allowed until the individual aliens have been released from the centre (the school) ... the examination can only be made reasonably effective if the individual can be tackled before he has had an opportunity of consulting with anybody in this country (for example the Norwegian authorities) ..."

Similar distrust arose over Norwegian arrivals from the Spitsbergen raid. The FO noted (12/9-41): "Four (Spitsbergen arrivals) ... MI5 and M/1 contradicted each other as to what actually occurred. Whoever was at fault, the publicity

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arrangements went all wrong ... M/1 failed to control the journalists ... interviews were published contrary to the previously expressed wishes of the Chiefs of Staff, the Norwegians and the Security Services ... The whole question ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ... is being considered over the recent incident with the Norwegians".

6.

27/4-40. The Marquess of Lothian, Ambassador in Washington DC: "We are being increasingly 'scooped' ~~XXXX~~ in the press here regarding the fighting in Scandinavia. The culmination of this tendency as I write is an apparently eyewitness report ~~XXX~~ by (Leland) Stowe, correspondent of the Chicago Daily News, describing as 'bitterly disillusioning' the handling of the ill-equipped and hopelessly outclassed contingent of British troops north of Trondheim (Namsos) ... In the absence of sufficient either eye-witness' stories of British and French vigour or an intelligent presentation of the background ... the picture of an incompetent Britain, unable to tackle the irresistible Nazi dash is rapidly forming itself in the public mind and from the United States will communicate itself to other neutrals"

W. Ridsdale of the FO News Dept. commented: "So far as I can make out, the whole question of press representation with the British forces in Norway is at present a complete War Office muddle".

I have not yet had time to check on General Paget and his relations with General Ruge, as you suggest.

But perhaps I have indicated the sort of evidence which can be collected from the Record Office by just dipping into the documents. I have no doubt that there is a very great deal more stuff of crucial interest to the IFS.

I therefore feel justified in accepting the terms set forth in the executive committee's resolution of October 5, 1971.

I note that the figures are considered by the committee to be "minimum limits".

The agreed sums should keep me going for a month, but I fear no longer as prices have risen astronomically since I was last in London 3½ years ago. For instance a simple bed-sitting room is not less than 200 N.Kr a week and the train fare from Liphook to Waterloo return, plus public transport at each end, amounts to another 35 N.Kr. It is also expensive to eat 'out'.

However, I do not now wish to look too far ahead or to lay claim to substantial extra funds at this stage. The main thing is to get started systematically and see how our arrangement works. When you have seen some considerable result of my labours, we can review the situation and you can judge whether it is worth while proceeding further.

I shall not be able to do much more research before I return to Norway in March. Meanwhile perhaps this letter will show you that I still keenly interested in the project.

With kind regards, Yours sincerely, Ralph Hewins.