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TRANSITIONS FROM FASCISM TO DEMOCRACY: EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR II

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Fascism is dead. What legacy did it leave? Thoughts and questions.

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The Death of Fascism

Around 1936 it would have been difficult to imagine that 40 years later there would be no fascist regime and no fascist mass party anywhere in the world. How did it happen? The easy answer is the defeat in World War II by the allied powers, that imposed either democratic or communist regimes on the defeated axis powers and their allies, with only Spain and Portugal surviving on the margin as reminders of the 30's until far into the 70's. Without going into a discussion of how fascist those two regimes were and how much the fascist movement contributed to the Franco regime in and outside of the regime, there is no question that they were the last survivors of the past, particularly Franco's Spain, so closely associated at one point with the axis in contrast to Portugal that maintained a benevolent neutrality toward the western allies. But is it really true that the appeal of an ideology, a movement, a type of regime can be eradicated by military defeat? Certainly, the allies when they conquered Europe in 1945 did not believe so, and many of their policies as well as constitutional provisions in the new democracies were based on the assumption that it would be hard to eradicate fascism and that it might very well revive, particularly under the difficult conditions of a post-war no one expected to be without serious economic and social problems. Some people of the slightest sign of a small neo-fascist party still feel that way.

Overstating our case we could say that the death of fascism was not the result of the anti-fascist policies of the victors, of the successor governments, of the efforts of de-nazification, but of the ultimate failure of fascism both as a movement and as regimes as well as of profound changes in our societies and political systems.

The ultimate reason for the defeat, the loss of any possible legitimacy of fascism, was Nazism, the most successful and powerful of the fascist movements and regimes. The identification of fascism with the Nazi totalitarianism and even worse, the monstrousities of Nazi rule, brought down any illusions about fascism. Certainly, if the movement would have remained identified exclusively with the Italian experience, particularly Mussolini's regime before the war, it would not be so sure that we would not find today movements linking with that ideological tradition. The fascist tree was brought down by the overgrown and heavy branch growing out of the grafting on it of a Völkisch-germanic-anti-semitic branch. Its weight uprooted the tree forever. Fascism became associated with everything evil connected with Hitler and the black myth of the SS staat, and it is difficult that any reasonable person could today identify with anything remotely linked with that past, although there is the paradox, difficult to explain, that probably more neo-fascist groupuscules link with national socialism than with Italian fascism. The war, initiated by Germany and carried by German armies all over Europe but with the methods of the SS, became a different war from others fought before and after. and the total defeat it brought with it, became identified with fascism. The great effort of a new type of national integration, of extreme nationalism, ended for the Germans in the division of the nation and not just in defeat with the normal loss of territory and pride. That outcome of the great dream cancelled all the achievements and successes the regime could pride itself on. Against the fears of the allies and in spite of some occasional morbid romantic identifications, Nazism could not appeal to post-war Germans. Italian fascism without that association in the minds of people might have survived.

Although we have stressed the enormous significance of Nazism and its defeat in the death of fascism, we should not forget that already in the later 30's fascism was finding a serious and perhaps unbreachable barrier to its progress in a large number of countries. In fact, minor fascist parties that had shown some success, confronted with the opposition of all political forces, from Christian democrats to communist, were losing some of their votes, for example, in Belgium and the Netherlands. Other political forces, like in the Baltic countries, turned to authoritarian rule rather than face growing fascist movements. Conservatives in Hungary while tolerating native fascists, sometimes collaborating with them, ultimately barred them access to power. Authoritarian regimes in eastern Europe, Yugoslavia, Portugal and Brazil confronted the fascists and in Spain, Franco, the military, the Church and the conservatives domesticated the Falangists. Elsewhere like in the U.K., Scandanavia and Finland, the fascist wave never crested to become a real threat to democracies that confronted with serious dangers and problems became in many ways more stable and consensual. Perhaps we should say that fascism was much less successful as a European and international movement than we sometimes think. Even in a country like Japan where we could find many conditions favorable to the rise of the fascist movement, the bureaucratic military authoritarian rulers soon turned against the small fascist movements. In fact, if it had not been for the war, fascist parties would not have gained power anywhere outside of Italy, Germany and perhaps Rumania, and a share in power in Spain. In spite of all the admiration even of democratic leaders and distinguished intellectuals at one point or another, first and foremost for Italian fascism and later with some hesitation for Nazism and their achievements, fascism was not

seen by significant segments of western electorates and elites as a desireable or legitimate political alternative for their own countries. Certainly, during those years they wanted to learn something from the fascist experience, to incorporate some elements of fascism into their politics, but that was far from embracing fascism as a conception of society and politics, particularly once they became aware of its totalitarian ambitions. If we keep those facts in mind it is perhaps incorrect to say that the defeat in war was the decisive factor in stopping fascism. In fact, democracies as well as authoritarian regimes became conscious of the threat of fascism and learned how to cope with it by democratic as well as non-democratic means. The war and the German hegemony with its consequences for the people of Europe only confirmed that hostility of the population, key institutions and elites to the national fascist movements.

The limits of fascist appeal and its rejection.

Today it is difficult to understand the appeal of fascism in its different varieties --particularly in the sense of "verstehen"-- and the enthusiasm it generated specially among the young and different sectors of the population. Assuming that appeal, we shall turn to account why even among them it ultimately was so limited in many countries, how many initially attracted become desillusioned and why today it only attracts a small fringe. Our analysis therefore does not deal with the rejection by groups initially hostile, identified with and loyal to other political movements.

Since I have dealt with the problem of the appeals of fascism elsewhere, I shall now focus only on those things people might have perceived after the rise of Hitler to power and even more after 1945 leading to an overwhelming rejection of fascism, even of those fascist movements that could not be seen as collaborationists with the German Nazi hegemony.

Foremost would be the violence associated with fascist movements and fascist regimes. Not only their own violence but the violent reaction that they produced which contributed so much to social and political turmoil and unrest. The ideological justification of violence within a society could not appeal but to a small segment, particularly of young people, and wherever the political forces and the state were capable and willing to maintain order fascists would find themselves isolated. In fact, some of the countermeasures taken by democracies aim to reduce the generation of violent activity by forbidding mass demonstrations, uniforms, etc. Perhaps one of the main lessons learned by democracies after 1945 was the maintenance of the monopoly of force in the hands of the state, the outlawing of any para-military political organizations and the willingness of all parties to trust in the police for the protection of their political rights, simultaneously with a much greater capability of police forces that would exclude the use of the armed forces in political and social conflicts and discourage any participation of supportive civilians in facing such crises. Only in more recent decades, terrorism has challenged that monopoly of force in the hands of the state but it is significant that extremists including the fascists would have to turn to terrorism rather than mass action in the streets. In spite of some analogies made between terrorist groups today and the fascists, their style of violence, without ignoring some overlapping characteristics, is fundamentally different.

Although anti-semitism was widespread in European societies and contributed to the appeal of Nazi-inspired fascism and eastern European fascisms, the particular forms it took after 1938 did not fit the sensitivities of many people

and the revelations about the monstrosity of the holocaust have for a long time tabooed anti-semitism, although in recent years the Palestinian Israeli conflict is making possible some expressions of it.

While the new sense of community expressed in fascist mass organizations and activities, the youth organizations and camps, the women's auxiliaries, the welfare activities, the Dopolavoro and KDF, the populist image of some leaders, the whole populism, were extremely attractive to some segments of society alienated from the bourgeois order and class conflict ideologies, they also were soon perceived as a threat to individuality, freedom, spontaneity and civility due to their military style, their hierarchical character, the discipline they demanded and their hostility to other forms of community, including the family. All those aspects led to the rejection of fascism by many people and to deep suspicion and hostility on the part of the churches. Although the new sense of community was presumably desireable in breaking status and class barriers which threatened the European social order - the bourgeois order - there were also perceived as threatening that bourgeois order with their psuedo-Gemeinschaft breaking down of status and class distinctions which were valued by large segments of the upper classes and the bourgeoise. Fascism with its new integrative nationalism to overcome class conflict and rejecting the cult of the proletarian of the left might have been welcomed by conservatives, but they soon discovered that fascist pseudo-Gemeinschaft bringing together in its organizations people of different social classes, education and manners was endangering their class and status based style of life. Fascist egalitarianism was not of their taste and it is revealing how the middle and upper classes in society like Spain withdrew from active participation in such organizations

which were neither obligatory nor opening opportunities for them in contrast to Germany and probably even Italy.

It would be interesting to explore to what extent the conservatives in many societies in the 30's realized that democracy offered them an opportunity to defend their interests and values, that social democracy was far from being the threat ascribed to marxism, and even that the control of the state apparatus and the armed forces offered an equal or better opportunity to defend the status quo than the unreliable fascist allies. This certainly together with repressive and discriminatory policies limited the success of fascism in much of eastern and south-eastern Europe, and assured the stability of an establishment controlled pseudo-democracy in Hungary and the consolidation of democracy in northern and western Europe. Probably only in Rumania a genuine popular movement attacking the establishment represented a real threat to it and was able to temporarily gain power. It would be interesting to explore systematically the conception by conservative forces of fascism in the 20's and the late 30's, and I am sure one would find much more positive response to Mussolini's regime than to the fascist movement and particularly its dynamics in the 30's.

In another place I have already discussed how the incorporation of some elements of fascism in a watered-down version by other political forces, like conservative Christian democrats in Austria and authoritarian regimes, made it possible to appeal to those who otherwise might have followed fascist leaders, to gain a mimetic legitimacy when fascism was hegemonic on the continent and to justify the isolation from above of grassroot fascist activists and movements. That syncretism deprived fascism of some of its momentum and contributed to belie its romantic integrative populist modern anti-conservative appeal.

Fascists were forced to compete with the fascitized conservatives, caught between the hostility of the working class, the democrats, the imitators and the true conservatives, there was less space left for them. The late latecomers of fascism found little political space for themselves.

Those who emphasize the importance of the economic crisis of the 30's in the rising crest of the fascist wave would claim that the slow recovery in the later 30's could account for the loss of appeal of fascist movements where they were competing with other political forces, an hypotheses deserving further exploration. I would not put too much emphasis on it since, as Zimmermann has shown in a comparative analysis, it is not easy to establish a clear relationship between the rise of fascism and the economic crisis, with the exception of the Nazi electoral success.

One of the strong appeals of fascism was its nationalism. In the countries facing international conflicts and tensions with Germany and Italy, that appeal had to be reformulated in terms of assuring the interests of the nation by the support for Munich and even pacifism, an essential contradiction with fascist appeals. A contradiction that certainly contributed to divide the a-democratic or anti-democratic right in France, where leaders like Déat and Doriot made their appeal on denouncing those who were ready to go to war with Germany.

In some cases, the fascist threat led to a much greater willingness of all democratic parties, from socialists to conservatives, to reduce the level of polarization in the societies and to cooperate in the defense of democratic institutions, as the Belgian case illustrates so well. In less polarized societies and in those in which all major groups agree on the value of democratic

institutions there was less room for fascism.

The fascist and even the Nazi rhetoric was initially ready and able to cover up its anti-religious dimension, the latent conflict between its totalitarian ambitions and the requirements of social and cultural pluralism of religious communities. But the Nazi policies and even some conflicts between Church and state in Italy sensitized the Church to the dangers of what at some point might have been seen as a ally in the struggle against Godless Marxism and masonic democracy. The Catholic community and leadership, even in countries like in Spain where it was allied with the Falangists as a result of the Civil War, distanced itself from the more dynamic potentialities of fascism.

The themes we have just enumerated and briefly illustrated explain why fascism as an ideology and a movement was facing serious limits to its expansive potential even before World War II, a period called by Nolte with some hyperbole the era of Fascism. I hope these comments might help us not to overestimate the importance of World War II and the defeat of the axis in the death of fascism. To make an analogy: if for some reason the Soviet Union would disappear as hegemonic power in Eastern Europe and a number of countries would become western types of political democracies with minority communist parties--something that cannot be excluded for Poland and Czechoslovakia and perhaps Hungary--we would be wrong in attributing the crisis of Soviet communism to the disintegration of the hegemonic power, since we all are aware of the profound crisis of Soviet communism in those countries today.

The victory of the allies in 1945 inevitably reinforced enormously all those tendencies to reject the fascist appeal and led to the disappearance of

those opportunists and ambiguous allies of fascism that had given the impression of fascist' hegemony in the thirties.

Learning from experience.

Fascism as a movement and fascist regimes were a personal experience for those who joined them and lived under them adapting to them and for those who opposed or struggled againt their dominance. Almost everybody learned from the experience and this "learning process" goes very far in explaining the rejection of fascism and the obstacles for its resurgence.

Perhaps the most important consequence has been that the new or restored democracies had learned from the fascist experience and were ready to pursue politics in a way that would make fascism much less attractive than in the 20's and 30's. This leads me to a discussion of the legacy of fascism as a negative experience, a learning experience for democrats, and later on to an analysis of the changes in the social and economic structure as well as in the cultural climate of post-1945 Europe that have made fascism unattractive even to those generations who had not lived through the tragic 30's and 40's.

People were tired and bored of the type of politics represented by fascism. As studies of former members of the Hitler youth show, the intensive efforts of political socialization were counter-productive. The constant barrage of political propaganda was rejected. The return to privacy was not only the result of the difficult times after the war but of a positive evaluation of family and intimate personal relations, rather than participation in collective organizations and activities. After youth organizations, Arbeitsdienst, the army, civil defense and everything else under the aegis of the party, people were not interested in living in such a highly politicized culture. Signifi-

cantly, "democratic parties of integration" that before the 30's had strived to create a communal sub-culture with their multiple activities and organizations, including those for youth and leisure, with some striking exceptions abandoned that model of politics because it probably reminded people too much of the recent past. Politics was in democratic pluralistic society to be increasingly a segment of social life; identification with the party and voting for a party particularly did not mean at all to abandon cross-cutting groups and loyalties in conflict or less supportive of the political choice. The new cooperation between political and social forces in the process of reconstruction and redemocratization tended to create non-exclusionary and non-inclusionary communities, a tendency reinforced by geographic mobility and later with growing prosperity, by social mobility. In fact, the rhetoric of community Gemeinschaft particularly in Germany had become suspect. The great exception was the communist party and particularly the PCI in the Italian red-belt. However, we should not forget that an integrated socialist sub-culture had developed in that area already since the turn of the century and that, in fact, the fascist learned a lot from those patterns of political social integration. Those rebuilding the socialist sub-culture, now under communist leadership, could see it as a continuation of a tradition destroyed by fascism rather than something similar to fascism, while the Catholics who had initiated the creation of a sub-cultural community before 1922 could respond in the same way. However, Italy in this respect might be the exception that confirms the rule.

After years in which a language of enthusiasm, of rhetoric, of emotions, of sentimentality predominated, the new political culture emphasized both pragmatism and rationality, something also demanded by the tasks of the time. A language that represented a break with the recent past. We cannot

underestimate, and it would deserve more serious scholarly research, to what extent the fascist experience led to a taboo on a whole language and style of politics shared before the 30's by many parties and movements and not only the fascists, particularly in the German culture area. That explains much of the tone of politics in the last four decades that today seems inadequate to younger generations not immunized to another language and style by the fascist experience.

Changes in European societies limiting any potential appeal of fascism.

Another approach to our problem leads us to ask what changes had taken place in West European society that reduced any potential appeal of fascism. To what extent were those conditions facilitating the rise of fascism in the 20's and 30's absent in the post-war Europe?

Perhaps the greatest change was that the feeling of a need for national, cultural and social integration in conflictual societies to which the fascist ideology appealed had been reduced. In the countries that had suffered the German invasion and occupation perhaps with the exception of Greece the common suffering and the unity in the opposition to the invader had created a new sense of national solidarity, reinforced by the moral exclusion of the collaborators, whatever reasons they might have alledged for their actions, except perhaps in France. In the victor countries a new sense of the common national fate was shared by almost everybody and even the communists through their role in the resistance could share in that solidarity.

The war and the occupation had also weakened in many ways the class

and status differences characterizing pre-World War I and interwar Europe by exposing all social classes to some of the same conditions; the random destruction, the common sacrifices, both at the front and the home-front, particularly through bombing. In this respect, the war was experienced very differently from World War I where the returning soldiers and particularly officers could feel resentful against those who had stayed home and profiteered of the war or benefitted of exemption from service. In addition, in no country the defeat could be linked with opposition to the war or a revolution against the national leadership since it was clearly due to military superiority with no internal forces demanding capitulation or surrender, with the partial exception of Italy. For a variety of reasons, the Front-erlebnis with the solidarity between classes and status groups unknown in civilian society before World War I did not have the same meaning in World War II. Perhaps European societies, both democratic and non-democratic, had become more egalitarian in the inter-war years and armies had stopped being a preserve of a noble officer corps.

One of the striking differences between the aftermath of the first and the second world war was the weakness of veterans politics and organizations after the last war. This weakness was partly due to the ban by the allied victors, partly because the demobilization was linked with welfare state type measures to integrate them and, perhaps more important, because no romantic interpretation of the war experience was possible either for participants nor for the youth that hadnot gone to the front but experienced the war in the reguard. If there was any romanticism it was linked to the resistance which became associated either with the new democratic regimes or the rise of communist parties and therefore with anti-fascism.

Another fundamental change was the substitution of the aggresive cult of the proletariat --the ouvrierisme -- of the left by a broad appeal across class and status lines, reflecting social changes, particularly the growth of the new middle class and the ideological revision by the left as a result of a fascist experience. Not only the Christian democratic inter-class parties but the social democrats and even the communists became catch all parties renouncing to emphasizing the blue vs. white collar dividing line.

Reconstruction after the war required new forms of class cooperation; conflicts of interest between workers, employees and employers became institutionalized, and some of the forms of personalized class and status conflict including violence like that after World War I were not revived. There were no attempted or failed revolutions in the western democracies (except in Greece) leading to the counter-revolutionary mobilization of the bourgeoise like after World War I, particularly in the defeated countries, the eastern borders of Europe and Italy. The communist mobilization after the break up of the anti-fascist alliance and with the onset of the Cold War could be controlled by the democratic governments often under the leadership of socialist parties. In the absence of revolutionary rhetoric and revolutionary attempts and with the growth of new forms of class cooperation and institutionalization of interest conflicts, anti-proletarian bourgeois conservative reactions had no appeal, while social reform, the expansion of the welfare state and in the case of Germany the Lasten-ausgleich contributed to make the social order acceptable to all.

No doubt that the prosperity following the hard years of the post-war, the successful reconstruction in most countries, the new

opportunities for social mobility and the onset of the consumer society contributed to the weakening of ideological passions and social ressentiment, leading to new forms of privatization and to a climate with less room for extremist politics than in the twenties and thirties. Political parties, particularly social democrats, adapted their appeals and their style to this new social reality and thereby eliminated the recurrence of the kind of conditions that had made fascism appealing, either as bourgeois defense or as an integrative national ideology.

The expansion of the welfare state with services provided to all or most of the employed population, if not to all citizens, reinforced those tendencies. It also served as a cushion against the impact of economic crisis, but perhaps more important than all economic changes where the changes in style of life that reduced social tensions. One only has to look at photographs of workers and employers meeting in the first decades of the century and after the second World War to realize how much western European societies had become leveled or homogenized middle class societies, whatever differences in wealth and income remained. The war itself and in Spain the Civil war, paradoxically fought to maintain those status and style differences, had contributed to irradicate or weaken them. Fascism itself was not alien to that process of erosion as Dahrendorf has noted for Germany. The threat perceived by the bourgeoisie in its confrontation with the idealized and mobilized proletariat found in the literature, the posters, the iconography, and the cartoons of the 20's and 30's, did not reappear. Nor did the forms of anti-militarism so prevalent after World War I; on the side of the victors because the army had been the savior from the Nazi domination and of the defeated because the blame for war and defeat could be directed

against the fascist leadership rather than the military establishment, which in Germany in addition disappeared as an institution. The strata and status groups that in the 20's and 30's felt threatened did not feel a comparable threat after 1945; although they probably paid a price in taxes, social security contributions, etc., social change was not a threat to their style of life and identity.

A new internationalism displaced or weakened the strong nationalist feelings on which fascism could build its appeal. This new internationalism, in part grew out of the cooperation between democratic parties across national lines, the Cold War that brought western democracies together, the new forms of European cooperation in the economy and other fields, the linkage to an international military security system with NATO under the umbrella of the United States. Even anti-communism after 1948 was not linked to extreme nationalism, like in the past, but to a new democratic internationalism and Europeanism. Again there was no need or room for fascism. In fact, the neo-fascist groupuscules tried to identify with and appeal to this European consciousness, calling themselves "Young Europe" and presenting the "European" Waffen SS army as a common struggle of Europe against communism and Hitler's "New Order" as an effort to unite Europe against the Soviet and USA hegemony.

To people who had lived under the "New Order", that old Nazi propaganda line --not without appeal to some younger generations in Franco Spain, sometimes even critical of Franco-- those themes had no appeal. Europeanism become identified with democratic parties, initially largely with the Christian democrats, later with all the democratic parties, including today even the Italian

communists.

It is interesting to note how some socialdemocratic parties, particularly the SPD under Schumacher's leadership, having experienced in the thirties the importance of nationalism in questioning the SPD in the Weimar polity, felt obliged to take a more nationalistic stance, leaving to their opponents, like Adenauer, to capitalize the new mood of suspicion of nationalism. As military theorists sometimes point out, learning meant in this case to fight the last war.

It is more difficult to pin down the socio-cultural changes produced by the war, the postwar and finally prosperity that reduced the potential for fascist appeals among those with a memory of fascism.

The war, and the misery of the post-war, as Rene König noted in early writings on the sociology of the family, reinforced the family as a social unit, weakening the appeal of any organized youth politics, and para-military organizations, all male politics of the type that lead so many in the inter-war years toward fascsim. This importance of the family unit in competition with larger communal types of organizations was reinforced by the new style of life associated with the consumption society, the ownership of the car, watching television and travelling for vacations to the Mediterranean shores. Those trends ... decried later as privatization and as a source of depolitization made undoubtedly the kind of political involvement characteristic of large segments of European society in the 20's and 30's infinitely less appealing. The type of organization, and activities we link to fascism found no echo in the newly emerging European societies.

It would be interesting to know if some of the changes taking place in the family in recent years, new forms of generational conflict, will not lead to

certain forms of political action that might have some points of similarities with those of the fascists although not organized by fascists or anyone using the same symbols than in the 20's or 30's.

Let us emphasize that some of those social economic and cultural changes reinforced and facilitated the political learning from the experience of the interwar years and fascism among political leaders leading to a very different style of politics after 1945. We do not think that social changes alone would account for those changes, political leaders should not have deliberately followed different strategies and tactics in those years. It is not sure that social changes alone could prevent the revival of forms of political action of the type that lead to the crisis of western democracies in the interwar years. In fact, the waning of the historical memory of fascism might allow new leaders to turn to some of the same style of politics, although perhaps for totally different objectives than those of the fascists. It remains, however, doubtful that even if the loss of historical memory makes certain forms of political action of dubious legitimacy in democracies again acceptable, the social changes we have noted might not limit their impact and isolate them without the need for violent confrontations with either the democratic authorities or those reacting against them.

Anti-Fascism as a Legacy

It would be difficult to understand European politics without the legacy of anti-fascism which contributed to the consolidation of democracy and a number of other social and political changes.

Anti-fascism became during the war and in its immediate aftermath a program and symbol uniting those who otherwise differed in their political roots, from liberals to Christian democrats, social democrats, communists, and some conservatives. It was an important factor in the solidarity in the reconstruction period, it created a certain consensus in the making of new constitutions like in the case of Italy, and it established certain personal ties through the common experiences in jails, concentrations camps and the resistance, as the case of Austria after 1945 exemplifies. It made also possible the incorporation of the communists into the national polity before they were forced to leave the government after 1947 in a number of countries. Anti-fascism, the memory of the resistance and some of the social ties established in the years of struggle, however, can still be evoked and established bridges across the ideological cleavage between communist and other parties as well as between socialist and Christian democrats. That shared experience of the opposition to fascism has helped in the process of consolidation of democracy in many countries.

Anti-fascism, however, has also united otherwise disparate groups in their opposition not only to any revival of fascist movements but to certain types of political action, isolating those who could be identified with fascism.

Only the abuse of the term and the inclusion under the label of fascism of any political activity one wants to oppose or destroy has weakened that basic consensus. Such a misuse of anti-fascism is likely to increase, the more remote in time the experience of real fascism, a process that in the future might make it more difficult for future generations to understand and support anti-fascism. The instrumentalization of that legacy might serve new and different political purposes, alienating from anti-fascism many of those without sympathies for fascism.

Anti-fascism has also been used in the process of de-legitimation of certain sectors of society and institutions that could in part be linked with fascism either historically or on the basis of theories of fascism. In this sense the Marxist interpretation of fascism has served as one more weapon in certain critiques of the capitalist economic system through some simplistic but politically effective identification between capitalism and fascism. The label fascist has become a useful tool in the political struggle without any intellectual precision to attack a wide range of political groups, including some of those identifying themselves as of the revolutionary left (for example, some segments of the youth revolt or the extremists supporting the ETA terrorists in the Basque country).

Although it might be intellectually useful to highlight some of the similarities between contemporary extremist politics, certain forms of political violence, and certain styles of politics incompatible with democracy, and those of the fascists, it is misleading to use the term for all those manifestations. In fact, it might blunt our efforts and capacity to understand

their nature, the threat they might represent to democracy, and the obvious differences; the manipulative use of the term, might indirectly serve to legitimize movements unjustly labeled fascist.

From being a meaningful and effective political stance, anti-fascism risks to become just a way to arouse political hostility, that can backfire on those abusing the term and paradoxically distort our sense of uniqueness of the fascist phenomena. ——— ——— Anti-fascism can also be used to legitimize political actions against opponents in a manipulative way and to legitimize political behavior that has no justification in a democracy. Forms of attack on institutions and persons, on the legal order, on democratic processes which sometimes remind one of those used by the fascist. The resulting confusion and turmoil paradoxically can become a new and different threat to stable democracies by contributing to create sympathies towards those behaviors among people who otherwise would reject them.

Anti-fascism is therefore another not fully unambiguous legacy of the era of fascism.

Anti-semitism, xenofobia, hostility to immigrants: are they harbingers of fascism?

In recent years we have seen manifestations of anti-semitism and xenofobia against foreigners, particularly the Gastarbeiter in a number of European countries, sometimes with strong undertones of racism or hostility to those of another culture, particularly the Turkish workers. Those incidents have raised the question; are they a sign of resurgence of fascism, a legacy of fasicsm, a new opportunity for the fascist activists to mobilize wider support, or should they be analyzed separately from the question of fascism. The answer is not easy and arguments can be made in favor of linking such disturbing events, particularly when they involve violence, with fascism and there can be no doubt that some extremist groups claiming the fascist heritage will become involved in such incidents.

An answer to the question, however, requires some reconsideration of the significance of racism, anti-semitism and xenofobia in the understanding of fascism. It might be useful to start with a few simplifying statements. Xenofobic and anti-semitic sentiments were shared by supporters of a wide range of political forces including sometimes segments of the democratic parties and the left, and although fascism in many countries identified with such sentiments, incorporated them into its political program, and as in the case of some eastern European fascism and particularly in Nazism made them central to its program, appeal and policies it would be a mistake to consider them essential to fascist movements. As a matter of fact, disagreement with Nazi racist anti-semitism was an obstacle to the attempts to form a fascist international. Before the rise of Nazism to power, anti-semitism had not been part of Italian fascism and in fact, as De Felice has shown, a number of leading fascists were Jews, Mussolini maintained good relations with Jews and even for some time, for his own reasons, with Zionist leaders. Fascism is conceivable without

exposing anti-semitism, although the extreme nationalism which is such an important part of fascist ideology is very likely to lead first to anti-Zionism and later to anti-semitism given the transnational character of Jewish culture and social community. The suspicion and hostility of fascists to all kinds of international identities, loyalities and interests undoubtedly created an affinity with anti-semitism. The fact that with the rise of racist Nazism a very large segment of the Jewish community the world over identified with anti-fascism, not making always a distinction between the Nazis and other fascists, reinforced that propensity.

Anti-semitism was not a central element in the appeal of fascism, except in the countries where it was already strong before the rise of fascism, like in some East European countries and France, and for the Nazis. In fact, some scholars have argued that rather than strengthening the appeal, even in the case of the Nazis, it might have been a source of distrust or distaste of sectors of the population because of its extreme formulations.

In view of all this it would be a mistake to think that the mobilization of xenofobic sentiments in the population could serve as a basis for fascist movements, unless other important issues and appeals were combined into a much more complex package. In fact, the fear that such manifestations are a sign of resurgence of fascism have generally been expressed in countries where fascism was important, while they did not emerge and sound plausible when anti-foreign sentiments expressed themselves in a stable democracy like Switzerland in the referenda aimed at limiting immigration. Furthermore, we should not forget that some of those anti-foreign sentiments, concretely against North African workers in France, have not been limited to parties on

the right but expressed by local leaders of the left. In my view, it would be a mistake to perceive the responses to a real problem / : the presence of foreigners with different ways of life competing for scarce jobs or housing, or at least perceived as competing for them, difficult to assimilate culturally and in fact nowadays claiming exemption from assimilation, as an issue growing out of a fascist legacy or reflecting sentiments with an affinity to fascism. Those are issues that have to be analyzed within each society as new problems emerging of new social situations. The same can to some extent be said about the linkage between anti-Israel, pro-Arab sentiments of some groups including those on the extreme left with the traditions of anti-semitism. There can be little doubt that there is some underlying continuity, not necessarily with fascism but with the broader culture legacy of anti-semitism.

This does not exclude the facts and the possibility that fascist groupuscules, intellectuals ready to revise history or even justify or explain away the actions of the Nazis, will not attempt to capitalize those incidents and sentiments. However, that fact in itself is likely to reinforce the hostile reaction of key institutions in society, important leaders, and broad segments of public opinion against the manipulation and mobilization of those sentiments. The specific policies resulting from such conflicts might not be always to the liking of liberal internationalist opinion, but their advisability remains within the realm of legitimate democratic debate. It is however the memory of Nazi and fascist racism, anti-semitism and xenofobia that inevitably colours political debate on issues like the status and integration of immigrants into a national social and cultural community. Once more the legacy of fascism is

not a question of continuity between fascism and todays politics, but of the permanent mark the fascist experience has left on our way of debating contemporary issues.

The significance of interpretations of fascism in the absence of personal experience as a political factor.

Another complex and far from unambiguous heritage of the fascist and authoritarian rule in Europe is the question of the lesson people might have learned from that experience to prevent its occurence. The interpretation of how it all was possible have become a factor in the political life of the new democracies. They are used in the contemporary political debates, conflicts and struggles and the farther we get from the actual experience of those events, the more ambiguous that heritage of the past becomes.

It would be important to study how the rise of fascism, particularly its access to power are seen by European today, how it is discussed in the more popular literature, the media, the magazines, the political propaganda, etc. Because independently of the scholarly validity and truthfulness of those accounts they constitute a politically relevant fact. To the extent that in some interpretations those events come to be seen in conspiratorial terms focusing on the role of particular actors in the history of that period without reference to the enthusiastic rank and file followers of the movement and their motives, it becomes easier to think that it could happen again. Rather than leading to a more cautious attitude toward "false prophets", toward misguided idealism or enthusiasm, the politics of passion, activism, verbal and physical violence, it can lead to the wrong idea that greater mobilization and a more violent reaction could have prevented the takeover. A distorted and simplistic view of the conflictual societies in which fascism and other antidemocratic solutions arose

could lead new generations to forget the lessons political leaders in the post-war had learned from their bitter experience. Let us not forget that when the only hope for the defense of democracy is the mobilization in the streets, if not on the barricades, many things must have been going wrong in the democratic process, many mistakes must have been made by the democratic leadership. In addition, I am skeptical that in the case of a real threat, those mobilizations will happen, that they would be successful and that they would not precipitate just those events they intend to prevent. (In this context we could discuss the 1934 October revolution in Spain, the May 1958 crisis in France, the attempted coup of February 1981 in Spain, to illustrate the point).

The question why their elders did not do anything to prevent what happened without any understanding the resources that the fascists and particularly the fascist regimes in power had, the desire to avoid through preventive actions anything similar to happen again, provides the opportunity and legitimation for forms of political action ilegitimate in a democracy and unpopular that many will perceive as "fascist". These are complex questions that I cannot develop at length here but cannot be ignored in discussing the legacy of fascism.

The Legacy of Fascism: National Differences.

Any analysis of the legacy of fascism has to keep in mind the enormous differences between countries.

Let us start by enumerating a number of quite distinct type of situations.

1. Those countries in which the fascist movements and parties were marginal fringe groups, weak and without links to major social groups or institutions, as it would be the case in Sweden or the United Kingdom. Those marginal groups are only of interest to the historian or the comparative political scientist who wants to understand why the appeal was so limited.

2. In some other countries similar groups unfortunately acquired greater importance thanks to German hegemony and occupation, but that fact itself contributed to their total de/legitimation as collaborationist, irrespective of the motives of their initial supporters, and/they would be punished, ostrisized and easily delegitimated. This would probably be the case for Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands and less clearly due to many other circumstances, France.

One of the legacies in this case is sometimes a revision of the extensive purges and/deprivation of rights of those not specifically guilty of crimes or collaboration but sympathizers or supporters of fascist movements when they were still legal in a democratic context.

3. Fascism becomes a more important phenomenon in those societies in which it represented a native-grown movement with its own personality and with considerable support before and independently of the presence of the German army, as it would be the case in Rumania with the Iron Guard.

4. The problem of the legacy of the era of fascism is particularly complex in the case of two countries that did not enter the war on the side of the Axis but where a fascist movement became / an important partner in the coalition supporting an authoritarian regime, like in Spain, or where in the absence of an important movement, an authoritarian regime born in the 30's could be seen as a fascist regime, the case of Portugal. The fact that these two regimes lasted into the 70's poses special problems to which we will turn later.

5. Finally we come to the two political systems in which fascist movements, the PNF and the NSDAP, took power--Italy and Germany--although the fascist period in both has a very different significance. It is in those two countries where the problem of the legacy of fascism is particularly significant. They are also those where the problem has attracted most attention of scholars and politicians.

Each of these different types of situations has its own distinctive problems and one of the results of this conference should be to document them and thereby allow a more systematic comparison. Most of the research probably has been focused on the treatment of the collaborators with the fascists in occupied countries and with German denazification. The comparison between Italy and Germany would be particularly relevant since in both countries the fascist party was a mass membership organization and occupied key positions in all spheres of society, although their / image and role in their respective society was certainly different, except for those fascists who supported the Salo Republic. In contrast, we know probably little about how the smaller fascist parties in countries where they did not reach to hold any power were reabsorbed in the society, and the legacy they left. In that context it would be interesting to have a paper by Helgio Trindade on the subsequent role in Brazilian society of the Integralistas, one of the few important non-European fascist movements which did not become tinted by collaboration in World War II to the same extent as others.

In the cases of Spain and Portugal the decisive variable comes from the very different way in which the transition from authoritarianism to democracy took place and the different roles that the fascist party strictu sensu played in both regimes. The key to the understanding of the different developments in both countries has to be found in the "transition by golpe" and the subsequent revolution of the carnations in Portugal that made possible the formal outlawing of parties identifying with the Salazar regime and a process of saneamento -of purges-, while the Spanish transition via. reforma pactada-ruptura pactada excluded such a radical discontinuity in Spanish society. Any comparison between Spain and Italy and more particularly Germany would have to take into

account the fact that the fascist movement was only one of the components of the regime, that occupied only certain spheres of power, and that since the late 40's experiences an internal transformation described to some extent in my paper "From Falange to Movimiento-Organización". In fact, some authors have spoken of a defascitization under the authoritarian regime. The process is of considerable ambiguity since it refers both to more reduced presence of the Movimiento organization and more particularly of the fascist true believers in the regime, and at the same time to a process of deideologization of the more specifically fascist organizations, like the youth organizations and particularly Sindicatos, the corporative organization. One of the difficulties in the Spanish case is to keep present the differences between political processes and changes at the central government level on one side and at the provincial and local level on the other, since attention to the later would have to modify some of the analysis, including my own, of the former. In both the Spanish and the Portuguese case we can not forget that although those regimes were born in the 30's and particularly the Spanish had a strong fascist component, thirty years passed since 1945 and new generations that had not lived the great days of fascism started coming to power within the regime and others grew up under it but not socialized by it, in fact, developing anti-regime positions long before their demise. Neither in Italy and particularly not in Germany can we find such co-existance of generations. In addition, in both Spain and Portugal the generations that had experienced the rise to power of fascism, the struggles for power and the repression subsequent to the takeover, were already dead or old men, particularly those in exile, out of touch with the changed societies in the middle 70's. In contrast to Italy and even Adenauer's Germany, there was no return to power of men of the pre-fascist generation.

In both cases, however, the most important factor was the impossibility of making any clear distinction between the state and the party or the movement in the way that it was possible in the case of Nazi Germany, particularly when we think of organizations of the party like the SS. In addition, only in Germany was the repressive and terroristic dimension of the regime distinctly identified with the party rather than with a professional police and army.

The analysis of the continuities and the discontinuities between the different authoritarian and fascist regimes and the successor democracies, therefore, presents enormous complexities that perhaps will be dealt in an expanded version of this paper on the basis of the contributions to the conference, or perhaps in a short paper focusing on the distinctive problems in the Spanish case. Certainly, the distinction between a totalitarian system, using the term in a strict sense perhaps limited to Germany, and authoritarian regimes would become useful in such an analysis. One dimension not to be ignored in such a comparison is the change experienced in the social and economic structure by different countries under non-democratic regimes, and I do not mean political changes but social, economic and institutional changes. Undoubtedly, in this respect the cases of Portugal and Spain again differ from those where fascism ruled for more limited time and mostly during World War II. In Spain it is almost impossible to separate the transformation of a pre-industrial, still largely agarian and poor society into an industrial, urbanized and consumption society from the Franco period.

The indirect impact of fascism on democratic politics after WorldWar II.

The rejection and condemnation of fascism did not involve only the parties, regimes, leaders and activist members, but an explicit or tacit consensus that certain forms of political action, a certain

style, certain forms of organization, certain issues, and even particular languages and words, were to be rejected. They therefore would be taboo for a long time.

This broad consensus, whose explicit and implicit content would be interesting to define, in my view could last as long as the dominant generations on the political scene would have a personal experience of fascism. With the passing of forty years and the coming to age of entire generations not sharing such an experience, to maintain that taboo is likely to become more and more difficult. Let me emphasize once more that the breaking with that taboo does not mean that there is an opportunity for the revival of fascism, that Neo-fascism would be on the rise. The taboo would be strong enough to reject any political package, any movement or organization that explicitly presents itself on the public scene using the specific combination of such factors characteristic of fascism. The fascist syndrome is still too easy to recognize and therefore still easy to isolate, and without any possible broad appeal. My argument would be that within that general rejection of fascism, whatever it might mean to today to people, what is disappearing is the sensitivity, sometimes even over-sensitivity, of people to specific elements that were important in the strange conglomerate of symbols, ideology and above all practice of fascism.

To give one example that might sound almost trivial, the use of the term "movement" Bewegung, Movimiento, rather than party and the rejection of the denomination of party is not likely to be without response by older generations. The same would be true for any rhetoric emphasizing the notion of community,

Gemeinschaft, vs. the articulation of the variety of interests in society and an agregation of individuals without such strong communal ties as a basis of political action. In recent years we find a style of political discourse and action that reminds people of the twenties and thirties and of fascism. A style whose legitimacy in pluralistic, parliamentary democracy as we have known it after 1945 would seem to many doubtful. Specifically, the questioning on one hand of the political process based on elections and secret voting, on the emphasis on procedural guarantees and forms, and on legal due process as a source of binding decisions, and on the other hand, the emphasis on collective pressures, public expression of intense sentiments, support for individual action challenging courageously the existing political or social order, expressions of solidarity or understanding for those opposing that order including violation of the law and violence, and the return to a politics of mass mobilization with massive demonstrations with banners, songs, the occupation of public space, the bringing together of people of the whole country for such purposes with their intimidating effect on governments and citizens, the use of political choruses at those events (Sprechchor), etc. Certainly, some of those expressions of political beliefs, convictions, moral stances of intense feeling minorities have a totally different content of the fascist movements of that time, but the similarity in political style is inescapable and probably was not acceptable in the years after 1945 in many societies of Europe. Let me emphasize that that style of mobilized intense passionate politics, sometimes bordering on the intimidation of opponents, turning to violence against the representatives of the state trying to enforce the legal order or the decisions of the courts was not a monopoly of the fascists in the interwar years. We

cannot forget that it was used extensively by the communists, sometimes by maximalist socialists and certainly by rightwing authoritarian movements and developed to its highest form in the Italian interventionism and particularly by D'Annunzio in Fiume. It is just the memory of the impact on the stability of democracy in the interwar years of that style of politics, of which the Nazi version was only one with its own characteristics, that was disturbing and made it taboo for a number of decades. Agitation as a form of politics seemed to those who had lived the 20's and 30's improper when democratic channels for political participation were and are available. The argument of the intensity and strength of moral conviction, feeling, enthusiasm, excesses of youthful activism, and the reversal of the accusations of violence against the agents of authority — also part of the political language of the 20's and 30's-would have been more difficult for those who had lived those years, would have sounded as justifying practices inacceptable in a democratic context and could even have been seen as semi-loyalty to the democratic institutions. It is the breaking of that taboo that I consider significant.

There are certainly forms of political action that the fascist experience has perhaps eliminated in western democracies with a fascist history forever. One of the most important is the rejection, sometimes the outlawing, of political uniforms. Let us not forget that they were not exclusive to the fascists; in Spain blue shirts with a red tie and red shirts with a blue tie identified the youthful militias of socialists and communists, while the youth of the right Christian democrats the JAP (Juventud de Acción Popular) wore khaki shirts, and the tiny groups of fascisticized monarchists green shirts.

Uniforms in politics today are limited to the fascist fringe groups and this in itself tends to isolate them and reinforce the rejection they experience by broad segments of the society including those who might sympathize with some of the ideals and goals they espouse. Certain physical expressions of politics like the Roman salute and the raised fist became a symbol of a political past, toward which the middle generations at least felt hostile or ambivalent. It was interesting to see how in Spain the communist leadership was much more sensitive to this than the much more youthful socialist who could not remember the civil war years when not to rise one's arm or one's fist was dangerous. Another permanent legacy, we hope, has been the outlawing or lack of appeal of any form of para-military organization either against democracy or for the defense of democracy or the activities of democratic parties. There is no room after 1945 for a Reichsbanner nor for a Schutzbund and the sporadic resurgence of tiny para-military groupuscules of the fascists arouses immediately public concern. One of the positive consequences of that period has been to establish clearly that the defense of democratic freedom has to be entrusted to the agents of the state, the democratic authorities rather than to groups organized with that purpose.

Let us note that with these taboos, certain forms of political activity that were important in the first decades of the century have also lost some of their appeal, and that the leadership of democratic parties opted for de-emphasizing or neglecting them consciously or unconsciously aware of their linkage with the past and fascism. Significantly, democratic political parties have not given attention to organizations for children and youth; "pioneers," encampments, marches, presence of organized childrens' groups at rallies, etc,

have not been popular after 1945. Probably changes in the social structure, in the style of life, (and the family itself, would anyhow have made those forms of activity less appealing, but it is my suspicion that they were rejected in part because they represented a legacy of the past. Let me emphasize that the absence of such forms of collective organization and interest in children and youth has left a certain vacuum and that such activities either sponsored by the state or by parties could have indirectly contributed to reduce some of the anomie of urban youth in our societies, as the Spanish sociologist Amando de Miguel has recently noted. We have already referred to the elements of privatization after the politization under fascism and also the feeling that politics should not penetrate all aspects of social life, that children should not be politicized until they reach the age of making their own individual free choices as citizens. I can imagine . in a few decades this taboo being, perhaps, broken. The same can be said about certain responses to the economic crisis and youth unemployment, like a labor service or labor camps, the Arbeitsdienst that was so important for the Nazis and some other political groups in the early 30's (not absent in the United States in the New Deal) but that nobody has attempted to revive in the present crisis with its massive youth unemployment. Something similar happens with the organization of a wide range of voluntary associations from women's auxillaries to sports, cultural centers and libraries, insurance organizations, cremation societies, nursery schools and what not under the aegis of political parties, as an instrument of "parties of social integration." Again social changes have reduced the attractiveness of such form of politicized social life, as those who were

tempted to revive in Spain the Casa del Pueblo as a socialist political and social headquarters in Spanish communities remembering what it represented for the working class before the Civil War, have discovered to their chagrin or disappointment. But initially that option, at least in some parts of Europe, cannot be understood without reference to the use of such forms of social activity by the Nazis and fascists.

It is not only the parties but the state that has renounced to a certain style of welfare state policies. Why should the modern welfare state not have continued supporting youth organizations with a civic ideological content, a female social service equivalent to the military service for men, leisure time activities like those sponsored by the dopolavoro and the KDF, voluntary labor camps for unemployed youth, collective and symbolic efforts to collect funds for welfare activities like the appeals of the Winterhilfswerk or the Eintopftag, etc., which in and by themselves could be seen in a positive light, aroused the enthusiasm, efforts and sympathies to many observers in the 20's and 30's, and served as an expression of collective solidarity. We could think of such practices linking with the problem of poverty and hunger in the Third World today. In my view it was the fascist experience which had eliminated for the time being at least any such welfare state with symbolic expression and "soul" rather than as the realm for profession bureaucratic activities. Again I would suspect that with the passing of the fascist memory some of those forms of social action could be rediscovered as something new and appealing without provoking the suspicion or rejection that they did in the last 40 years. Let me put it in an exaggerated form to make the paradox more explicit:

Things that intrincicaly did not have to be fascist and that could have been attractive and legitimate within a democratic context became unacceptable because of the memories they evoked.

Even some themes like the love for nature, the return to the countryside, the rejection of urban ways of life, the sponsoring and revival of folk culture, dances, etc., were themes that for a long time found a negative echo and only recently the renewed concern with the environment has made more acceptable.

The terrible experience of the holocaust, of medical experiments on human beings, the euthanasia program, the sterilization of mentally defective or criminal persons, particularly by the Nazis, has given in the last decades an enormous significance to the sacredness of human life and excluded any serious debate about eugenic policies. I have not had the time to do the necessary research but I am under the impression that many of those issues which today are associated in the mind of people with the racist Nazi regime were far from taboo in the discussion of liberal and democratic political forces and intellectuals, including the socialist movement. It would be extremely interesting to study the social, political and ideological linkages of the eugenic movement, the supporters of such measures as sterilization of criminals, "voluntary" or legal, of euthanasia in the first decades of the century and the absence of such movements and linkages after 1945. Certainly, resistance to a discussion of such issues today is still linked with the memories of the Nazi incorporation of such ideas into their racist program and the monstrosities to which it lead. Again, I would think that perhaps with the exception of Germany and Austria it will be difficult for many, only in a few decades, to understand

Attitudes of Europeans Toward Authority at Work

	Total	Great Britain	North Ireland	Republic of Ireland	West Germany	Holland	Belgium	France	Italy	Spain	Denmark	Sweden	Finland	Scandi-navia	Latin Europe	Northern Europe
Should follow Instructions	33	49	49	45	28	39	33	25	24	29	57	40	43	48	25	38
Must be convinced first	42	34	25	26	51	33	31	57	39	41	21	32	40	31	26	41
Depends	20	14	23	25	18	21	23	15	34	21	13	26	16	17	24	17
Don't know	4	3	3	4	3	8	12	2	4	9	10	2	2	4	4	4
Mean Score	1.90	2.15	2.25	2.21	1.76	2.06	2.02	1.67	1.85	1.87	2.40	2.08	2.04	2.18	1.79	1.97
Standard Score	.001	.001	.008	.006	.001	.003	.003	.001	.001	.002	.005	.003	.005	.002	.001	.001
Weighted Population (100's) Aged 18+	2231106	400814	10225	21580	432816	101510	71979	366420	415292	243950	38210	61743	36310	166521	1025662	1038925
Unweighted Interviews	15589	1231	312	1217	1305	1221	1145	1199	1348	2303	1182	886	994	4308	4850	6431

People have different ideas about following instructions at work. Some say that people should, in principle, follow the instructions of their superiors related to their job, even when they do not fully agree with them.

Others say no-one should be expected to follow their superior's instructions in a job without being convinced that the instructions are right. Rather than as a matter of principle.

Which of these two opinions do you agree with?

Source: European Values Study

and accept that linkage as an argument in a "rational" debate on such issues. I can think that the "immunization" impact on such issues of the historical experience will sooner or later fade and, to the surprise of many, those issues will not necessarily be raised by neo-fascist or conservatives but by progressives, as they very often were originally around the turn of the century. #
An even more complex issue which I think deserves further analysis is the legacy of anti-authoritarianism that the rejection of fascism has introduced into the western European value system and has found expression in the school, the family, the university, and many other institutions. Sometimes turning into anti-authority, anti-discipline and a legitimation of a pervasive permissiveness. This has been a tremendous gain and advance but also become a source of new conflicts and tensions in societies where there is a need for some legitimate exercize of authority.

In this context it would be particularly interesting to compare the ideological anti-authoritarianism in countries that have experienced fascist or authoritarian regimes and those that have escaped them. I am thinking of a comparison between Germany and Austria with the Scandinavian countries or Switzerland to stay within a similar culture area. Some of the data of the European values study in which I have been involved seem to support the need for further exploration of this theme.

Institutional changes.

Another consequence of fascism and fascist regimes, both direct and indirect, has been a restructuring of the system of interest groups: trade unions, empleyers and farmers organizations. In contrast to the fractionalization along ideological-political, regional, sectorial or product and historical lines, new

organizations were founded, integrating those diverse interests into large nationwide single (or dominant) bodies. . These organizations were more or less successful, like in the trade union field where we find both the unified DGB in Germany and the split in France, Italy and Portugal after unity attempts. In some cases it is possible to trace a direct continuity, in others the unification was the result of the experience of the twenties and thirties in which those different divisions made a common and effective response to the crisis so difficult. In addition, some of the leaders of the new organizations remembered how those many and rival organizations were often taken over by the fascists.

This integration of interests into larger groups has facilitated some of the reconstruction and stabilization policies on Western democracies, as well as the formulation of "social pacts", policies of wage and price stabilization that recently have attracted so mucho attention of scholars. They also have provided a more effective representation of certain interests, like the farmers, that felt left out and frustrated in industrial societies in the twenties and thirties and therefore became radicalized.

Some of the studies of interest organizations in countries like France and Germany have focussed on these changes, but a comparative analysis including Italy and now Spain and Portugal, might be particularly rewarding. The objective should not be to focus on the continuity of personnel, inevitable due to accumulated technical experience in the organizations of authoritarian regimes (we find it even between the communist and socialist trade unions and plant level union leadership in Spain), but on the institutional problems of the past and the post-fascist period.

It is the realm of institutions where we would find the most interesting national differences. Paradoxically we would surmise that the more purely fascist a regime was, the more it tried to shape the society, restructure all institutions, make them part of the party, and colonize them, the less continuity in the institutions. On the other hand, the more the regime introduced changes that could be justified on purely technical and efficiency grounds, not justified ideologically, administered by the state apparatus without direct intervention of the party and affiliated organizations, the more permanent the legacy.

An example would be the continuity in the labor legislation and related policies in Spain or Portugal, compared to Germany and probably even Italy. Since those policies were not implemented through the official trade unions (sindicatos) but by the Ministry of Labor, to the extend they benefit the empleyees, they are unquestioned gain on which the democratic institutions and policies derived from collective bargaining are superimposed. This in fact represents in Spain the accumulation of benefits based on different policies: to the francoist emphasis on job security, vacations, etc. in exchange for relatively low wages, while democracy and trade union freedom, working class mobilization and collective bargaining, led to rapid rise in wages.

One institutional realm where we probably would find greater c continuity with Vichy France, the Estado Novo and the Franco regime than with Nazi Germany would be the regulation of agriculture.

The hypothesis advanced above explains why some of the policies

in the field of youth, popular culture, home-economics education, sports activities, "social vacations", etc. would be discontinued: they all were more directly linked to the party and justified on ideological grounds.

Conclusion.

We hope to have shown that the question of "the legacy of fascism" can not be reduced to our concern with neo-fascism, the success or failure of de-fascistization, the continuity of institutions in particular countries, but has to include the analysis of the "collectice memory" (to use Halbwachs expression) and of the multiple ways in which politicians and societies responded --learned from-- the fascist experience. Last but not least, the implications of the fading of the memory of the politics of the first half of the century for contemporary and future politics, the opposite of the learning process, the process of forgetting.

To summarize I would say we should not obsessed by the spectre of fascism but we should not forget what that complex and terrible phenomenon meant, nor what democrats learned from the crisis that led to fascism. Man is, and probably should be, a historical being, rather than like animals that can not transmit the cummulative learning of past generations.

Postcript.

I intend to add to this paper extensive footnotes both bibliographical and substantive. The later will provide examples relevant to the discussion, sometimes public opinion survey data, some quotations. I also expect to present tables or graphs in the text, some to present some of the typologies implicit or used in the text, particularly should I develop the section nn national differences.

I could also incorporate into the paper sections of my paper "Fascism, Breakdown of Democracy, Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes.Coincidences and Distinctions" in which I deal with the question: What difference does the "death of fascism" make to post 1945 authoritarian regimes? (pp. 81-84 of the ms of that paper).