

sions and one tank brigade might be reckoned as costing about £40,000,000. The balance of the £50,000,000 estimate may have been accounted for by the mechanization of the two cavalry brigades at home and the one in Egypt; by the provision of war reserves for the "army" brigades of artillery, already mechanized; and the equipment of the new "infantry tank" battalions which were to be formed on the scale of one to a division.

Examining the White Paper forecast of expenditure in the light of this estimate it is not easy to see how any vast increase can be caused by the steps that the White Paper indicates for the modernization of the Regular Army. It is expected that the mechanized cavalry brigades, instead of being composed of two motor cavalry regiments and one light tank regiment, may now have two of light tanks. But this could hardly make more than a few million pounds difference.

Nor could the four new infantry battalions, of which two are to be raised in the future—this will presumably be done either by reviving the 2nd Battalions of the two Ulster regiments, the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers and the Royal Irish Fusiliers, or by restoring some of the disbanded battalions of the old four-battalion regiments. The annual cost of an infantry battalion is just over £100,000, and of this the pay of the men is by far the largest item, accounting for more than half; the provision of equipment for these new battalions would cost less than in the more heavily armed branches of the Service. The measures now "designed to improve conditions and to make the Service more attractive" may have a cost which looks considerable when viewed as an isolated item, but they will add only a fraction to the normal annual cost of maintaining the Army.

NEW TANK BATTALIONS

Against these relatively small increases on the original figure must be set the fact that the White Paper only foreshadows the creation of "two new Army tank battalions," compared with the five which were indicated by the War Office decision announced as far back as 1934. The existing 4th Battalion Royal Tank Corps has for some time counted as an Army tank battalion, and there is reason to believe that the intended number is now to be partially made up by taking the 6th Battalion, hitherto a mixed type battalion, away from Egypt and converting it to the new role. But even this will leave one division still unprovided for. It hardly seems to be in accord with the conditions of modern warfare, and especially the unsolved difficulties of the attack, that our tank strength, so slender compared with that of other countries, is only to be increased from six battalions to eight. That limitation should at any rate act as a check on ideas of sending the Army in bulk to take a direct part in a major campaign on the Continent.

The White Paper also foreshadows the modernization of the Territorial Army, which is certainly demanded if the Second Line is to gain efficiency and receive due encouragement. To equip it with new weapons and mechanized vehicles on the same scale as the Regular Army might cost nearly double what was calculated for the latter, on the basis of comparative numbers. The White Paper does not convey that such a step is being taken; it implies, rather, that a modified scale will be adopted, sufficient for training purposes.