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In the above map of Poland the 1939 frontiers are shown by a black line. The 1914 frontiers of Germany, Austria, and Russia are also indicated, together with the boundary line agreed between the Central Powers and the Bolsheviks by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918 and the Curzon Line of December 8, 1919. This was an attempt to define Poland's eastern frontier by following roughly the ethnographical frontier.

LESSONS OF WAR IN POLAND

NEW AIR TACTICS

FROM A MILITARY CORRESPONDENT

As further scraps of information about the Polish campaign come to light a few more lessons can be drawn from it.

It now appears that what has hitherto been written about the devastating power of the German air forces requires still further emphasis. In the early hours of September 1, before the Poles were aware that a state of war existed, German aircraft bombed the whole line of Polish aerodromes along the Polish western frontier, catching the Polish aircraft on the ground or in the hangars and in many cases destroying both. This crippling blow was accompanied by a bombardment of railway junctions, which had the effect of dislocating the Polish mobilization, completed on the frontier but apparently not in the interior. Yet another feature seems to have been the employment of bombers to form what in artillery parlance used to be called a "box barrage," that is a quadrilateral of fire cutting off the objective, preventing its garrison equally from launching a counter-stroke or from withdrawing, and isolating it from reserves or reinforcements.

RIGHT WING THRUST

There likewise exists evidence that the thrust of the extreme German right wing from Slovakia across the Eastern Beskids and the Tatra Mountains through Wysowa, Nowy Sacz, and Nowy Targ was of the highest importance. The Polish forces, engaged in facing a frontal attack from the west at the heart of their industrial area, were taken in rear by the astonishingly rapid progress made by these German columns from the south. The result was not only that the struggle in the District of Katowice was instantly decided in favour of the aggressor, but also that Cracow itself had hastily to be abandoned.

Polish circles are inclined to believe that there may have been negligence on their side in this instance. If that were so it would accord with the view of our Special Correspondent on the Polish frontier that the engineers in this campaign represented the weakest side of the Polish Army. These western Carpathian passes are readily defensible, and demolitions on mountain roads are infinitely more obstructive than in the plains. The effect of the demolitions carried out by the Germans in the spring of 1917, when they withdrew to the Hindenburg Line, will never be forgotten by British soldiers who took part in the pursuit. There may well come a time in a delaying action or in a retreat when the role of the engineer assumes an importance far greater than even that of the machine-gunner.