

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10

Reference:-

2021/1391


117030

12/12/40

Registry

Rough 2/2

- (1) Mr. Willes
- (2) Return



2/2/40

Mr. BRIDGES

Here is the draft of the C.O.S. Report of their visit. This draft is being considered by the Chiefs of Staff at 10 a.m., and copies will be circulated to the War Cabinet during the course of the morning.

If the P. has time to run through this Report, it may perhaps help him in deciding whether there should be a meeting of the War Cabinet at 8 p.m. tonight, to give preliminary consideration to the issues involved.

The P. will remember that the Secretary of State for War is available this afternoon, but will not be available on Saturday morning.

(Signed) E. E. BRIDGES

2nd. February, 1940.

Stiftelse	2	norsk	3	okkupasjon	4	onshistorie	20	4
	1						2	

Reference:- *Cap 21/1391*

1492

Ho St Jceast



GENERAL ISMAY.

PLANS AND PREPARATIONS FOR SCANDINAVIA.

The Service Departments have now practically got the "all clear" to go straight ahead with all their preparations for intervention in Scandinavia. An expedition would, however, involve us in a heavy shipping commitment, and we ought to take care that any civil Departments concerned take the necessary steps in time, so that they are not caught short if and when the demand for shipping arises.

The War Cabinet have not yet considered W.P.(40) 34 - the Memorandum by the Ministry of Shipping and Ministry of Supply on the arrangements to be made to ensure that we are not faced with a shortage of Swedish ore in April. It may also be that heavy demands on shipping will cause some shortages in certain other commodities. I understand that the present heat cation is somewhat generous in view of the supplies on hand and in sight.

I suggest that W.P.(40) 34 should be considered by the War Cabinet as early as possible, and that the Lord Privy Seal should be invited on that occasion to see whether any other similar action by civil Departments is necessary to make all our preparations for a Scandinavian expedition complete.

Ho

Scandinavia

3rd February, 1940.


I agree with the above. As regards shipping, I will look into that here also. But I think it is better to leave the matter to the Admiralty.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014					

Reference:-

Sub 21/13911

14928



H.R.

- S E C R E T -


COLONEL HOLLIS.

As you will see from the attached letter of the 5th February to Sir Cyril Hurcomb and his reply, I think the best plan for dealing with the Shipping problem would be to invite the Minister of Shipping to attend any Meeting at which the War Cabinet hear the report of the discussions on the Supreme War Council, and what decisions are reached as to preparations for intervention in Scandinavia.

I am not much enamoured of the suggestion that the Lord Privy Seal should be invited to see whether any other similar action by Civil Departments is necessary to make our preparations for a Scandinavian Expedition complete. The matters concerned are matters of Departmental responsibility, and I think the best plan will be to ensure that any Departments likely to be concerned are informed direct of the position and are left to consider the matter themselves and to make any necessary representations. The question of any modification of allocation of shipping is a matter which the Ministry of Shipping should consider in the first instance and submit the necessary recommendations.

5th February, 1940.

CEB



Hold to me to 1940

NOON SECRET.

9th February, 1940

Dear Sir George Mounsey.

At a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Sub-Committee held on the 8th February, 1940, the Committee agreed that the Secretary should -

"invite the Ministry of Economic Warfare to advise the Chiefs of Staff as to the economic effect on Sweden of an effective blockade of her Baltic ports."

The discussion which gave rise to this request for information as to Sweden's susceptibility to blockade was on a very secret matter, and it would be rather difficult to give you any further information without giving you the whole history. This I am rather reluctant to do in a letter.

I do not think that the Chiefs of Staff in addressing this enquiry to the Ministry of Economic Warfare expected, or desired, a closely argued or very detailed reply: if indeed such a paper was desired it would obviously be necessary to give you fuller information as to the background from which this question originated.

If you would like me to come round to elaborate these terms of reference orally, I will, of course, willingly do so.

*Mounsey,
Dad L. G. Howie*


Sir George Mounsey, M.C.M.C., C.B., C.D.E.
Ministry of Economic Warfare,
Adolfi, W.C.S.

1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40

Reference:- Cab 21/1391

1492

CC
CAPTAIN CLARKE.



I can see no objection to your giving the French the general sense of these telegrams, although I imagine that they have by now heard all about it from their own people in Paris.

CC

27th February, 1940.

1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

C.O. 21/1391

14928



The Secretary,

Chiefs of Staff Committee
of the War Cabinet.

With reference to Item 4 of the Minutes of the 41st Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff held on 27th February, 1940, C.N.S. has asked me to inform you that Captain W. H. D. Friedberger, Royal Navy, has been nominated as Naval Representative on the Delegation referred to.

A copy of this communication has been sent to C.I.G.S. and to C.A.S.

Secretary to
Chief of the Naval Staff.

28th February, 1940.

1	2	3	4	5	6
		1		2	


Reference:- *Cap 21/1391*

14928

SECRET.

COLONEL FELLIS.

*Captain G. G. G. - I think
 on the telephone his name
 was up - Passi
 Wko. LCH 29.1.40*



BALTIMORE AND SCANDINAVIAN DISCUSSIONS.

I thought I would just put the following in writing. It might prove a useful aide memoire to you.

Scandinavia.

The British Representatives on the Allied Military Committee have authority to discuss Intervention in Scandinavia with the French. For this purpose they have been told to use Paper No. C.O.S. (39)141 as their basis. Actually the British Representatives envisage keeping off the high plane stuff as much as possible, as it is out of this that the major issue arises which can only be resolved at the Supreme War Council. They believe that what the French want to discuss is the plans which might be put into operation, and the consequential preparations which are necessary. The main portions of the draft Paper No. C.O.S. (40)218 contain everything that is wanted as a brief to the Representatives. Therefore, although not specifically so authorised, they unavoidably do in fact use the contents of this Paper to a large extent.

To put it on a proper basis it would perhaps be wise to record at the next meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, when they take this report, that its contents may be used as a brief for the British Representatives.

Assistance to Finland.

Lecky on S. 50/20.

This the French also want to discuss in Committee, and approval is covered by similar approval to discuss Intervention in Scandinavia. The British Representatives cannot yet embark on this particular side until they have a brief from the Chiefs of Staff. This is in preparation and should come up before the Chiefs of Staff on Monday. The question is whether the brief will also:

1	2	3	4	5	6
Stiftelsen	norsk	Okkupasjonshistorie,	2014		
	1		2		

Reference:-

Cab 21/13911

14928

require Cabinet approval. If so that cannot be obtained until after the Allied Military Committee have left for France. Unless I hear to the contrary I feel that the contents of the draft brief before the Chiefs of Staff on Monday could be used at once by the British Representatives, as all these talks are specifically on the clear understanding that they do not pre-judge the issue or bind higher authority in any way. I feel that the French would be quite content to know what the Chiefs of Staff's view is on their ideas for assistance to Finland, even if there was no authority to say that the British Government might undertake such assistance.

Immediate Assistance to Turkey.

The British Representatives await any brief that may be possible on assistance to Turkey in the near future under realistic conditions. Here again, they should have in their possession the J.P. version of the brief before they leave England. It is possible that the Chiefs of Staff may not have approved it before their actual departure. Should this be so it would be important to let me know the moment it is approved, as it will be very germane to the immediate talks in France.

Phillips


26th January, 1940.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014					

Reference:-

Cap 21/1391

14928



~~SECRET~~

C.C.S.

In accordance with C.C.S.(43) 37th Conclusions, Minute 8, I asked the Secretary of the War Cabinet if he would take instructions as to the procedure to be followed for bringing Paper No. C.C.S.(43) 253(S) to the notice of Ministers.

The Secretary of the War Cabinet has asked me to inform the Chiefs of Staff that it would be impossible to substitute Paper No. C.C.S.(43) 253(S) for Paper No. C.C.S.(43) 254(S) (which has already been taken note of by the War Cabinet on the 16th of February) without explaining to the War Cabinet what the differences are between the two Papers.

He therefore suggests that the best procedure would be to circulate to the War Cabinet a short Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff explaining that paragraph 10 of the earlier Paper should be regarded as modified in certain respects. A draft Memorandum in accordance with the above proposal is circulated herewith for approval.


...

If, in addition, the Chiefs of Staff thought it desirable to submit a revise of the earlier Paper embodying these modifications, there would be no objection to this course, but it would appear hardly necessary in the circumstances.

I am sending a copy of this minute and of the draft Memorandum to the C.I.C.S. and the C.C.S.

(Sd) H.L. Smith
L.G. Hollis

26th February, 1940.

-SECRET-C.A.S.

In accordance with C.O.S.(40) 57th Conclusions, Minute 3, I asked the Secretary of the War Cabinet if he would take instructions as to the procedure to be followed for bringing Paper No. C.O.S.(40) 253(S) to the notice of Ministers.

The Secretary of the War Cabinet has asked me to inform the Chiefs of Staff that it would be impossible to substitute Paper No. C.O.S.(40) 253(S) for Paper No. C.O.S.(40) 234(S) (which has already been taken note of by the War Cabinet on the 16th of February) without explaining to the War Cabinet what the differences are between the two Papers.

He therefore suggests that the best procedure would be to circulate to the War Cabinet a short Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff explaining that paragraph 10 of the earlier Paper should be regarded as modified in certain respects. A draft Memorandum in accordance with the above proposal is circulated herewith for approval.

...

If, in addition, the Chiefs of Staff thought it desirable to submit a revise of the earlier Paper embodying these modifications, there would be no objection to this course, but it would appear hardly necessary in the circumstances.

I am sending a copy of this minute and of the draft Memorandum to the C.I.O.S. and the C.N.S.

Wangler
Art

(Vad) *H. J. Smay*
L. G. Hallis

26th February, 1940.

*Deployment of land forces
in Scandinavia and Central*

R. F.S.



~~SECRET~~

C.I.C.S.

In accordance with C.O.S.(40) 27th Conclusions, Minute 3, I asked the Secretary of the War Cabinet if he would take instructions as to the procedure to be followed for bringing Paper No. C.O.S.(40) 253(S) to the notice of Ministers.

The Secretary of the War Cabinet has asked me to inform the Chiefs of Staff that it would be impossible to substitute Paper No. C.O.S.(40) 253(S) for Paper No. C.O.S.(40) 234(S) (which has already been taken note of by the War Cabinet on the 16th of February) without explaining to the War Cabinet what the differences are between the two Papers.

He therefore suggests that the best procedure would be to circulate to the War Cabinet a short Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff explaining that paragraph 10 of the earlier Paper should be regarded as modified in certain respects. A draft Memorandum in accordance with the above proposal is circulated herewith for approval.

If, in addition, the Chiefs of Staff thought it desirable to submit a revise of the earlier Paper embodying these modifications, there would be no objection to this course, but it would appear hardly necessary in the circumstances.

I am sending a copy of this minute and of the draft Memorandum to the C.H.S. and the C.A.S.

(sgd) *H. L. Ismail*
L. G. Hottel

26th February, 1940.

26 Feb 1940 46/15

1	2	3	4	5	6
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie 2014					

Reference:-

Cap 21/1391

12928



23rd February, 1940.

~~SECRET~~

Dear Speed.

I think General Ismay has already spoken to you about the Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff tomorrow, Saturday, the 24th of February, to consider certain preparatory measures in Northern Europe. The meeting will be at 10 a.m. in the Cabinet War Room which you can reach by the St. James Park entrance to the Office of Works. There will be somebody at the entrance to conduct you down to the War Room.

...
...
I am sending herewith a copy of a memorandum by the C.I.C.S. which was discussed at this morning's meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, together with a copy of the Confidential Record of the discussion which took place. I think this record is self-explanatory and should provide the necessary basis for our discussion tomorrow.

In addition to the Chiefs of Staff, Maclean of the Foreign Office and General Lewin will also be present.

Laurie,

(Wd) G. Hollis


E.B.B. Speed Esq., M.C.,
Treasury.

1	2	3	4	5	6
	1		2		

Reference:-

C.O. 21/1391

14928

SECRET.GENERAL ISMAY.INTERVENTION IN SCANDINAVIA.

Notwithstanding an explanation by me this morning to the French Representatives on the matter of the study of intervention in Scandinavia (See to-day's minutes), in which I explained that the Chiefs of Staff were actively considering the French paper but felt that it could not yet receive consideration by the Allied Military Committee until the major issues arising out of any such project had been dealt with on the high plane; the French Representatives returned to the attack strongly.

They pointed out that the paper which they had handed in specifically recorded the wish of General Gamelin that the Allied Military Committee should at once undertake this study. It is fairly evident that the trouble is that General Gamelin knows that we have already studied the problem and have a plan to be put into operation under certain contingencies, and that he is anxious to know what this plan is, with its consequential military implications, before discussion takes place on the high plane.

The French Representatives entirely agreed that, of course, the major points consequent upon the adoption of any such plan for intervention must be resolved between the two Governments, but they argued that there was no reason to await this before embarking on an Allied examination of the military plan which would be required. They want to know and discuss what force would be required, what they would do and where they would go. In other words, they want to hear the British plan and see how they may be involved in it.

The French Representatives said that, of course, any preliminary examination of any plans would not be taken as prejudging the major issues yet to be discussed between the two Governments.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Stiftelsen norsk	Okkupasjons	historie,	2014		
	1		2		

Reference:-

Cap 21/1391

1492

It is a difficult position which strikes me as liable to develop on exactly the same lines as the Balkans if we are careful.

The French Representatives were very firm this morning and it was a bit difficult to combat their contentions. The situation is that Gamelin has told them to do something and we say we won't play yet.

I suggest that really there can be no harm in discussing with them the British plan. Discussion of the plan will not commit the War Cabinet or the S.W.C. Starting now, incidentally, will not only comply with Gamelin's expressed desire in writing, but also ensure that there is less delay after the S.W.C. before things can be put in train.

(Sgd) A W Clarke


25th January, 1940.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie 2014					

Reference:-

Cab 21/1391

14928



28th February, 1940.

~~SECRET~~

CC: Mr. G. G. G.

Dear General.

A Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff has been arranged for 10 o'clock tomorrow, Saturday, 24th of February, in the Cabinet War Room.

I am sending you a copy of the memorandum which was discussed this morning and of the Confidential Record of that discussion which I think gives us the basis for a meeting tomorrow.

A representative of the Treasury and the Foreign Office will also be present.

Yours etc,

(Dad) L. G. Hollis


Maj-General Lewin, C.B., C.J.G., D.S.O.,
War Office.

Stiftelsen	den norske	Okkupasjons	historie	2014	6
		1	2		

Reference:-

Cab 21/1391

12912



23rd February, 1940.

~~SECRET~~

Dear Maclean,

I think General Jarmay has already spoken to you about the Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff tomorrow, Saturday, the 24th of February, to consider certain preparatory measures in Northern Europe. The meeting will be at 10 a.m. in the Cabinet War Room which you can reach by the St. James Park entrance to the Office of Works. There will be somebody at the entrance to conduct you down to the War Room.

... I am sending herewith a copy of a memorandum by the C.I.G.S. which was discussed at this morning's meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, together with a copy of the Confidential Record of the discussion which took place. I think this record is self-explanatory and should provide the necessary basis for our discussion tomorrow.

In addition to the Chiefs of Staff, Speed of the Treasury and General Lewin will also be present.

Laurie,

W. G. Hollis.

F.H.R. Maclean Esq.,
Foreign Office.

1	2	3	4	5	6

Reference:-

2021/1391


1492

S. 50/101

[Handwritten signature]

Anglo-French Liaison Section,
War Cabinet Secretariat,
Hotel des Invalides,
Paris.

22nd February, 1940.




Dear General,

I received yesterday the copy of your letter to Colonel Petibon together with enclosed Memorandum by the Chiefs of Staff. This I have read and placed in the safe until Redman's return from leave at the end of the week. Though not instructed by you to do so, I thought it better to acknowledge its safe receipt.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur Heit



General Ismay,
Offices of the War Cabinet,
Richmond Terrace,
Whitehall,
London S.W.1.

Stiftelsen	norske	okkupasjonshistorie,	2014	6
1		2		

Reference:-

Cop 21/1391

149

In reply please quote
Reference No.

~~SECRET~~~~IMMEDIATE~~

MINISTRY OF ECONOMIC WARFARE,

HOUGHTON STREET,

S.57/15

ALDWYCH, W.C.2.

14th February, 1940.

Dear Cornwall-Jones,

Herewith our notes on the Swedish question you put up to us.

It has proved a particularly difficult one to answer with any degree of exactness because one really needs to have the assumed situation more precisely defined than, as we quite understand, it can be. And for that reason I am afraid we have to ask that the notes should be used with more than usual caution! In any case I am sure that if they are incorporated in some larger document, as no doubt they will be, you will give us a chance to comment on the result.

I will wait for you to ring up to say whether you want us to come round and discuss this afternoon.

Yours sincerely

A. J. Watson.

Major A. T. Cornwall-Jones,
War Cabinet Office.


1	2	3	4	5	6
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie, 2014					
	1		2		

Reference:- *Cap 21/1391*

1492

SECRET.

*Copy to Col. Hollis
for information*



GENERAL ISMAY.

The Petsamo Operation.

You will realise that the Appreciation on the Petsamo operation prepared by the British Military Representatives (C.O.S. (40)244(S)) has not been seen by the French Representatives on the Allied Military Committee.

The British Representatives suggest that, when this Appreciation is taken by the Chiefs of Staff, permission should be at the same time obtained to hand a copy to the French Representatives for their information.

In view of Conclusion 11 of the 5th Meeting of the Supreme War Council the French must be assuming that we are considering any plans possible for a Petsamo operation, and it is thought that there would be every advantage in letting them see now the British military view of what would be entailed. This contention is apart from the lesser one that the French Representatives here know full well that the British Representatives have been involved in the last few days in something of moment, and it would be an act of courtesy to reveal to them what the activity has been.

(ss) R. W. Clarke


10th February, 1940.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Stiftelsen	norsk	Okkupasj	onshistorie, 2014		
		1		2	

Reference:-

Cap 21/13911

149



20th February, 1940.

MOST SECRET

My dear Jack,

....

I return herewith the two personal notes you handed me yesterday afternoon in the War Room.

I think there is obviously a very great deal in what you say, and I share your anxiety lest we should give the Scandinavian countries reason to believe that we are in a position to give them more help than we can. However, I myself feel pretty sure that if the operation comes off, it will not be via the diplomatic path that has been carefully mapped out, but by some botch on the part of Hitler.

Turning from the general to the particular, I agree with you that the Germans could make a landing of a force at Trondheim and subsequent maintenance, a perilous and uncomfortable business, but I do not think that we can take it for granted that they would select this as a target, bearing in mind the fact that they have allowed our Expeditionary Force to trickle steadily over to France, although their passage brought them so near German air bases. You will remember that before the war we were always very gloomy about the possibility of getting an expeditionary force to France at all in the face of air attack.

No time to dictate here, but I should love to have a yarn about all this some time.


(Sgd.) A. I. Hornwall

Air Commodore J.C. Claxson, M.C., R.C.,
Air Ministry.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie 2014					

Reference:- Cab 21/1391

1498



MOST SECRET.

14th February, 1940.

Dear Bridges,

The President has asked me to thank you for your letter of the 9th February^{*} and for sending him the Confidential Annexes to the War Cabinet Minutes relating to the discussion about Scandinavia at the 31st and 35th Meetings. I return those Annexes herewith.

* Flay X.

These Annexes, as you expected, explain the position to him in sufficient detail for his purposes and he does not wish to see the papers in the W.P. series which were referred to during the discussion.

He would, however, be grateful if you would continue to keep him informed of developments in this way.

Yours sincerely,


Sir Edward Bridges, K.C.B., M.C.

1	2	3	4	5	6
Stiftelsen norsk Okkupasjonshistorie 2014					

Reference:-

Cab 21/1391

1492



SECRET.

COLONEL HOLLIS.

I suggest that when the Questionnaire by the British Military Representatives on a certain project is considered by the Chiefs of Staff, the British Military Representatives should be invited to attend the Meeting. This would be following the procedure adopted when the J.P. Questionnaire was taken by the Chiefs of Staff last Thursday.

The British Military Representatives would then hear the views of the Chiefs of Staff first-hand and would probably be able to go straight ahead with the Directive without waiting for the flood of paper which would otherwise probably be necessary to put them in the picture.

I know that the British Military Representatives themselves would very much like to be present.

(Sgd) A W Clarke

13th February, 1940.